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Abstract · 
This thesis investigates the effects of initial inequality upon subsequent economic 
growth through human capital accumulation and endogenous fertility. The theoret-
ical implication that inequality has a non-monotonic effect upon growth, as opposed 
to a seemingly common agreement that it has a negative effect upon growth, has 
been empirically supported. 
The thesis comprises six chapters. Chapter 1 motivates the study of inequality 
and economic growth. Chapter 2 reviews both the theoretical and the empirical lit-
erature in this area, and discusses several channels whereby inequality might affect 
growth. Amongst those, accumulation of human capital will be the focus for the 
rest of the thesis. In addition, fertility plays an important role since it is endoge-
nously determined with investment in human capital. As a result, this thesis deals 
simultaneously with inequality, human capital accumulation, endogenous fertility, 
and growth, whilst existing studies deal with only subsets of these. 
Chapter 3 incorporates endogenous fertility into the model of the benchmark 
study in this area by Galor and Zeira (Review of Economic Studies, 1993), which 
looks at the relationship between inequality and growth via human capital accu-
mulation. This extended model predicts a negative relationship between initial 
inequality and subsequent growth, but two problems arise. One is that the prob-
lematic definition of inequality in Galor and Zeira (1 993 ) is still used, and the other 
is that the model consistently generates negative growth. 
Chapter 4 attempts to overcome these problems. We give a different interpreta-
tion to the model by Ehrlich and Lui (Journal of Political Economy, 1991), which 
lX 
Abstract X 
deals with endogenous fertility, human capital accumulation, and growth. Whilst 
they look at a country as a whole, we focus upon a number of heterogeneous indi-
viduals within a country, in order to incorporate inequality. This model predicts 
that growth is negatively correlated with fertility but positively correlated with the 
stock of human capital, which conforms to the stylised facts. The inequality effect 
upon growth is illustrated using numerical simulation, and it predicts that the effect 
may not be monotonic, i.e., it depends upon an economy's stage of development . 
Economies are classified into two types, one where the long run growth rate is pos-
itive, and the other where it is zero. In the former type of economy, inequality is 
likely to impede subsequent growth, but in the latter, inequality may not have any 
significant effect upon growth. 
Chapter 5 presents an empirical test of this conjecture. The conjecture that 
the effect of inequality upon growth is non-monotonic appears to be supported. 
For either advanced or developing economies, inequality appears to have sizable 
effects upon growth, although the direction of the effect appears to be different -
inequality impedes growth for the former but enhances growth for the latter. In 
contrast, for medium-income economies, the effects appear to be trivial. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Inequality and economic growth 
This thesis investigates a relationship between initial income inequality and subse-
quent economic growth. 1 We particularly focus upon investment in human capital 
and the rate of fertility as the economic factors through which inequality might 
affect growth. 
This introductory chapter emphasises the importance of pursuing this question. 
We also briefly review the relevant debate and explain the distinguishing features 
of this thesis. The outline of the rest of this thesis will be provided at the end of 
1 
"Growth" is a little tricky economic term. Especially, we need to be careful distinguishing 
between growth in the short run and growth in the long run. In empirical studies, "short run" 
usually implies a time period around 5 years and "long run" means a time period around 20-30 
years. However, when theoretical analysis is concerned, we tend to consider "short run" as time 
periods when an economy is on the transitional path and "long run" as where an economy is in the 
steady state or on the balanced growth path. In this thesis, in the empirical sense, we will focus 
upon investigating a relationship between initial income inequality and long run growth. However, 
in the theoretical respect, our focus will be on the short run, as we look at growth between two 
consecutive periods during transition. These are consistent as our main theoretical modelling in 
Chapter 4, where we employ a three-period overlapping generations (OLG) framework, growth 
between two consecutive periods implies growth in 25 years, which is long run growth in the 
empirical sense. 
1 
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this chapter. 
1.2 Why bother? 
Why should we bother pursuing this question? If inequality had nothing to do with 
growth, there would not be much point pursuing it. Even if it had anything to do 
with growth, if the effect of it upon growth were trivial, investigating this topic 
might not be that interesting. 
For a number of developing countries, understanding what fosters economic 
growth has been a very important and serious issue. According to the World Bank's 
World Development Report (1997), the population of the world in 1995 was over 
5.6 billion and 56 per cent of the population resided in "low-income economies," 
whose GNP was only about 5 per cent of the world's GNP. Over 80 per cent of 
the world's GNP belonged to "high-income economies," where only about 16 per 
cent of the world population resides. There is dispute regarding the measurement 
of income disparities across the countries, 2 but it is beyond all dispute that the 
income disparities are still huge and that the disparities are increasing in the case 
of most Sub-Saharan economies relative to the OECD economies.3 
Hence, if differences in initial inequality across economies can cause substantial 
differences in the subsequent growth rate of output per worker, then it would be 
worthwhile to investigate the relationship. This thesis confirms the findings of the 
2It is noted in many papers that these figures calculated by the official exchange rates tend 
to underestimate GNP of "low-income economies." For example, Dowrick and Bruten (2000) 
report that the ratio for US/Mali GDP per capita in 1980 is 58 using the exchange rate, but is 31 
using the Penn World Table estimates of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita. Various methods have 
been proposed to measure the true GDP (Dowrick and Quiggin, 1994, 1997, Dowrick and Bruten, 
2000), and Dowrick and Bruten (2000) find that the true ratio for US/Mali GDP per capita in 
1980 lies between 52 and 55. 
3 See, for example, Easterly and Levine (1997) regarding the miserable experience of Sub-
Saharan African countries. 
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existing empirical literature that the effect of inequality upon growth is non-trivial,4 
but it proposes a different economic relationship that has important implications 
for the direction of the effect. 
Reducing income inequality has been one of the important issues, especially 
in developing countries. Although it is controversial, 5 avoiding inequality is often 
justified on ethical grounds. If we knew inequality would have negative impact 
upon growth, policies that might reduce inequality, such as an implementation of 
redistributive income tax, might not only be justified on ethical grounds but they 
might also be justified on economic grounds. 
Unsurprisingly, there has been long debate on the relationship between inequal-
ity and growth. Let us briefly review the relevant literature. 
1.3 A brief review of the literature 
Conventionally, income inequality was thought to have a positive impact upon eco-
nomic growth. 6 This view is due to Kaldor (1961), Stiglitz (1969), and Bourguignon 
(1981). Kaldor (1961) postulates that the marginal propensity to save is higher for 
the rich than for the poor. An immediate conjecture that follows this, bearing 
in mind the Swan-Solow growth model, is that a more unequal economy reaches a 
higher steady state income level than a more equal economy does because its saving 
4This is not true for all economies. We have to wait until Chapters 4 and 5 in order to further 
discuss this issue. 
5For example, see Ray (1998) for discussion. 
6The focus of this thesis will be the effect of inequality upon growth. Closely related and 
probably more commonly known issue to this, is the effect of economic development upon in-
equality, initiated by Kuznets (1955). Kuznets (1955) conjectures that economic development is 
necessarily accompanied by an increase in inequality since only rich people can obtain benefit 
from it, but then after a while inequality will decline when eventually poor people catch up. This 
is known as the inverted-U hypothesis because a plot of income on the horizontal axis and the 
Gini coefficient on the vertical axis will look like an upside-down U. This inverted-U hypothesis 
has been challenged by a number of studies such as Anand and Kanbur ( 1993) since the mid-70s. 
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rate tends to be higher. Stiglitz (1969) shows , using a linear saving function, that 
the aggregate capital accumulation behaviour, which determines the growth ;ate 
of aggregate output (in transition), is independent of the distribution of wealth. 
Bourguignon (1981 ), then, extends this analysis using a convex saving function, 
and predicts under this situation that the growth rate of aggregate output (in 
transition) is dependent upon the distribution of wealth, and that a more unequal 
economy will reach a higher steady state income level. If output is a linear function 
of capital, 7 the long run growth rate will be higher for a more unequal economy. 
In the 1990s, this conventional view has been challenged by a number of the-
oretical and empirical studies. 8 On one hand, a number of empirical studies have 
provided evidence that inequality has a negative impact upon growth ( Alesina 
and Rodrik, 1994, Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994, Birdsall et al., 1995 Clarke, 1995, 
Perotti, 1996, Persson and Tabellini, 1992a, 1992b, 1994). One the other hand, 
in order to account for this empirical evidence, many theoretical studies have for-
mally shown that inequality might impede growth through various economic factors 
(Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Acemoglu, 1995, Benabou, 1996c, Benhabib and Rusti-
chini, 1996, Bertola, 1993, Galor and Zeira, 1993, Galor and Zang, 1997, Grossman 
and Kim, 1996, Persson and Tabellini, 1994). "Inequality is harmful to growth" 
appears to have become a common agreement. 
More recently, some empirical studies (Barro, 2000, Forbes, 2000, Li and Zou, 
1998), using a panel data estimation technique, have found new evidence that 
inequality fosters subsequent growth in the short run, or that inequality affects short 
run growth in a non-monotonic manner. 9 Deininger and Squire (1998) find that 
7In this case, the economy will be approaching the balanced growth path in the long run 
instead of approaching the steady state. 
8 A more comprehensive review of the literature of this strand will be provided in the next 
chapter, as this study is complementary to it. 
9The reason that we highlight "short run" here is because in their estimation, the dependent 
variable is the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita over 5 (or 10) year periods. This 
thesis and other empirical studies that have been mentioned look at growth in the long run, say 
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inequality has significant effect upon long run growth only in the non-democratic 
countries. Alongside of these studies, this thesis questions the common agreement 
and emphasises the non-monotonic nature of the effect of inequality upon growth. 
1.4 How might inequality affect growth? 
We have briefly talked about both qualitative and quantitative effects of inequality 
' 
upon growth so far, but let us now consider the possible mechanisms by which 
inequality might affect growth. A major drawback of many recent empirical studies 
in this area is the ad hoc nature of the econometric model. That is, most of them 
are estimating a typical reduced form equation, where growth is just regressed 
on economic factors including inequality. Although those studies have detected a 
negative relationship between inequality and growth, they have not been able to 
tell how the former might affect the latter. 
Inequality per se does not have direct impact upon economic growth, but it 
affects growth through other economic factors. According to Temple (1999), there 
are three proximate sources of economic growth, namely, investment in physical 
capital, investment in human capital, and research and development. Inequality is 
included in underlying sources of economic growth, which affect economic growth 
directly through change in total factor productivity or indirectly through the above 
three sources. Aside from inequality, other underlying sources of economic growth 
include population growth, trade, financial development, macroeconomic stability, 
government size, government spending on infrastructure, and social and political 
factors. 
This thesis particularly looks at investment in human capital as the proximate 
source of growth, i.e., we conjecture that inequality affects growth via its effects 
upon investment in human capital. Galor and Zeira (1993) is the pioneer study of 
this strand whose model will be reviewed in detail in the next chapter. 
over 25 years ( see footnote 1). 
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What makes our study different from theirs is that, this thesis will also focus 
upon the rate of fertility, which is obviously strongly related to one of the other 
sources of economic growth, population growth. Therefore, in this thesis, we pos-
tulate that inequality might affect economic growth through both investment in 
education and fertility. A strong prior belief that we have behind this, is that in-
vestment in human capital and the number of children, hence fertility, are jointly 
determined by parents. This approach, which we refer to as the endogenous fertil-
ity approach hereafter, is originally taken by Becker (1960) and has been used in 
some of the recent endogenous growth literature, such as Becker et al. (1990) and 
Ehrlich and Lui (1991). These studies adopt a representative agent framework so 
there is no room for discussing inequality. 
The principal theoretical contribution of this thesis to the literature is that it 
deals simultaneously with inequality, investment in human capital, fertility, and 
growth, where the existing literature deals simultaneously with only subsets of 
these. More specifically, our model in Chapter 3 incorporates endogenous fertility 
into a benchmark model by Galor and Zeira (1993), and in Chapter 4 we incorporate 
inequality into a model by Ehrlich and Lui (1991). 
This theoretical modelling enables us to overcome the drawback of a typical re-
duced form regression. Our econometric model in Chapter 5, which is a system of 
equations, is based upon theoretical implications from Chapter 4. Whilst we can-
not interpret the coefficient on inequality variable in the reduced form regression, 
the empirical analysis in this thesis allows us to interpret the effect of inequality 
upon growth more clearly. Therefore, our empirical contribution is twofold. First, 
we question the common agreement that inequality impedes growth in all cases, 
emphasising the non-monotonic nature of the effect of inequality upon growth. 
Second, our structural econometric model enables us to interpret the effect of in-
equality upon growth much more clearly than typical ad hoc estimation in existing 
studies. 
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1.5 The structure of the thesis 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews both the the-
oretical and the empirical literature. A number of empirical studies that identify 
negative relationship between initial inequality and growth will be introduced and 
we emphasise that inequality has a sizable effect upon growth. Several underlying 
mechanisms that could possibly back up the empirical evidence are reviewed and 
discussed. By the end of this chapter, it will become clearer how this thesis fits 
into the existing literature and what our contribution to it is. 
Chapter 3 incorporates endogenous fertility into the model of the benchmark 
study by Galor and Zeira (1993), which looks at the relationship between inequal-
ity and growth via human capital accumulation. This extended model predicts a 
negative relationship between initial inequality and subsequent growth, but two 
problems arise. One is that the problematic definition of inequality in Galor and 
Zeira (1993) is still used, and the other is that the model consistently generates 
negative growth. 
Chapter 4 attempts to overcome these problems. We give a different interpreta-
tion to the model by Ehrlich and Lui (1991), which deals with endogenous fertility, 
human capital accumulation, and growth. Whilst they look at a country as a whole, 
we focus upon a number of heterogeneous individuals within a country, in order 
to incorporate inequality. This model predicts that growth is negatively correlated 
with fertility but positively correlated with the stock of human capital , which con-
forms to the stylised facts. The inequality effect upon growth is illustrated using 
numerical simulation, and it predicts that the effect may not be monotonic, i.e., it 
depends upon an economy's demographic stage of development. 
In the chapter, economies are classified into two types - one that has begun the 
demographic transition, and the other that has not. By beginning the demographic 
transition, we mean that individuals have become to choose to have less numbers 
of children, so that the growth rate of population in an economy declines and 
approaches zero. We will show that if an economy has begun the demographic 
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transition, the growth rate of output per capita will be positive in the long run. 
We will also show that, in contrast, if an economy has not begun the demographic 
transition, it will stagnate. Our simulation predicts that, in the former type of 
economy, inequality is likely to impede growth, but in the latter, inequality may 
not have any significant effect upon growth. 
Chapter 5 presents an empirical test of this conjecture. The conjecture that 
the effect of inequality upon growth is non-monotonic appears to be supported. 
For either advanced or developing economies, inequality appears to have sizable 
effects upon growth, although the direction of the effect appears to be different -
inequality impedes growth for the former but enhances growth for the latter. In 
contrast, for medium-income economies, the effects appear to be trivial. 
This thesis is concluded by Chapter 6 where we summarise the thesis and suggest 
possible further research directions. 
Chapter 2 
A review of the literature 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we review both the theoretical and the empirical literature that 
has analysed the effect of inequality upon growth. Our focus is the literature that 
has recently challenged the conventional view that inequality is good for growth. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 reviews empirical studies that 
estimate a typical reduced form growth equation. We emphasise that most of these 
studies have found a negative relationship between inequality and growth, and that 
the effect of inequality upon growth is non-trivial. 
As we emphasised in Chapter 1, reduced form studies cannot tell what underlies 
- how inequality might affect growth. Section 2.3 reviews theoretical studies that 
have attempted to explain it, as well as empirical studies that have attempted to 
support these theoretical studies. 
It will become clear in Section 2.4 how this thesis fits into the existing literature 
and what our contribution to it is. 
9 
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2.2 Stylised fact: Reduced form studies 
A number of empirical growth studies that include a certain measure of inequality 
on the RHS of a growth regression have been conducted ( Alesina and Rodrik, 
1994, Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994, Birdsall et al., 1995, Clarke, 1995, Deininger 
and Squire, 1998, Perotti, 1994, 1996, Persson and Tabellini, 1992a, 1992b, 1994). 
Table 2.1 summarises the main results of these studies . 
Table 2.1: Reduced form regressions 
Author(s) (year) LHS Inequality Sign of the 8LHS/8SDa 
variableb indexc coefficientd 
Alesina and Rodrik ( 1994) gdp Gini - NA 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) gdp or GDP -MID (-) NA 
Birdsall et al. (1995) gdp 1-MID - 0.32 
Clarke (1995) gdp various - 2.5 (2SLS) 
Deininger and Squire (1998) gdp Gini - 0.5 
Perotti (1994) INV -ID - NA 
Perotti (1996) gdp -MID - 0.6 
Persson and Tabellini (1992a) gdp -MIDDLE - at least 0.5 
aaLHS / 8SD shows a percentage point increase of the LHS variable if inequality is reduced by 
one standard deviation. Clarke (1995) also calculates it based upon his OLS result, which is 1.3 
percentage points. 
bgdp: the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita over the sample period; GDP: the 
average annual growth rate of GDP over the sample period; INV: the average of the ratio of 
investment to GDP over the sample period. 
c Gini: Gini Coefficient; MID: the share of the third and fourth quintiles of distribution, ID: 
the share of two bottom quintiles of the distribution; MIDDLE: the share of the third quintile of 
the distribution; various: Clarke (1995) uses various measures of inequality. Correlation amongst 
these measures are high, and the regression is found to be robust against the choice of the in-
equality measure. Gini coefficient based upon land rather than income is used in Deininger and 
Squire (1998). 
d A sign in brackets means the estimated coefficient of the inequality measure is insignificant. 
Aside from Birdsall, et al. (1995), estimates are significant at at least 5 per cent level. 
Most of these studies show a negative and statistically significant correlation 
between inequality and economic growth. The magnitude of the effect of inequality 
upon growth differs between one another: A one standard deviation decrease in a 
measure of inequality raises the annual growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.32-2.5 
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percentage point. 1 
Two question have to be asked. First, is this effect significant? In other words, 
is the magnitude of the effect huge enough to call our attention? Second, regardless 
of the significance of the effect, what is the mechanism underlying it? That is, how 
might inequality affect growth? 
A common way to analyse the effect of inequality upon growth is to see what 
happens if a measure of inequality changes by one standard deviation. Let us 
use Birdsall et al. (1995) as an example. A one standard deviation decrease in 
inequality leads to a 0.32 percentage point increase in the growth rate of GDP per 
capita. Considering that the standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP per 
capita is about 0.02, we can regard that this effect is sizable. If we compare two 
economies that are identical but for initial income distribution by one standard 
deviation, GDP per capita will be 8.2 per cent higher after 25 years in an economy 
with the lower inequality of initial income distribution. 
Having checked the importance of the effect of inequality upon growth, our 
interest now is to consider the underlying mechanism by which inequality affects 
growth. One obvious drawback of the standard growth regression using the reduced 
form, i.e., regressing the growth rate of GDP per capita on various economic vari-
ables including a measure of inequality, is that it is unable to tell the underlying 
mechanism. Given this, in the 1990s, some economists have attempted to con-
struct theoretical models in order to back up these empirical results . In addition, 
some empirical studies using the structural form have been conducted to test these 
theoretical models. 
1Recently, empirical studies by Forbes (2000) and Li and Zou (1998) have shown that inequality 
fosters growth. These studies use panel data and the average annual growth rate over 5 years is 
used for the dependent variable. Hence, they are looking at growth in the short run, whereas our 
focus is growth in the long run. 
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2.3 Four mechanisms 
Many studies that explore the mechanism by which inequality might affect growth 
have been conducted. Let us classify the theoretical studies we review into four 
approaches according to Perotti ( 1996). 2 
In the first approach, which we call the endogenous fiscal policy approach 
(Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Bertola, 1993, Persson and Tabellini, 1994), income 
distribution affects economic growth via its effect upon government expenditure 
and taxation. In the models of this approach, the level of taxation and expenditure 
are determined by a vote. Since the level of taxation and expenditure preferred by 
an agent are inversely related to her income, if the crucial voter, the median voter, 
has less income than the mean income, government taxation will be strengthened. 
If we consider the ratio of the median voter's income to the mean as the measure of 
equality, applying the theory of endogenous policy, we can say that redistributive 
government expenditure and therefore distortionary taxation decrease as equality 
increases (political mechanism). In turn, government expenditure and taxation are 
negatively correlated to economic growth as agents lose their incentives to save and 
invest under high taxation ( economic mechanism). As a result, economic growth 
increases as equality increases. 
In the second approach (Acemoglu,1995, Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996, Gross-
man, 1991, 1994, Grossman and Kim, 1996, Murphy et al., 1993, Tornell and 
Velasco, 1992), income distribution affects economic growth via its effect upon 
sociopolitical instability. In more unequal societies, agents are more likely to be 
involved in rent seeking activities or other manifestations of sociopolitical instabil-
ity, violent protests, assassinations, etc. In turn, sociopolitical instability harms 
growth through uncertainty and an adverse effect upon productivity due to disrup-
tion in market activities. As a consequence, economic growth increases as equality 
increases. 
2Benabou (1996c) is also a survey paper on this topic. But this paper does not cover the fourth 
approach. 
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In the third approach (Aghion and Bolton, 1997, Banerjee and Newman, 1993, 
Benabou, 1993, 1996a, 1996b, Durlauf, 1994, Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996, Galor 
and Zeira, 1993, Perotti, 1993, Piketty, 1997, Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1997), in-
come distribution affects economic growth via its effect upon investment in human 
capital. This type of model is meaningful when agents are not able to borrow freely 
against future income, i.e., when market imperfections are present in the capital 
market. Under this situation, initial income distribution matters as it affects the 
number of agents who can invest in human capital. The model generally concludes 
that, if wealth is distributed more equally, more agents are able to invest in human 
capital. Since economic growth is assumed to increase as investment in human cap-
ital increases, we obtain the same conclusion as above: economic growth increases 
as equality increases. 
The fourth approach, which we call the endogenous fertility approach, takes 
fertility into account (Barro and Becker, 1989, Becker and Barro, 1988, Becker et 
al., 1990, Galor and Zang, 1997, Kelley, 1988, Perotti, 1996). In this approach, 
fertility and schooling decisions are made jointly, as they are interpreted as two 
alternative uses of parents' human capital. That is, fertility determines the parents' 
quantity of immediate descendants and schooling determines their quality. This 
model concludes that fertility decreases and investment in human capital increases 
as equality increases. Since growth is assumed to be negatively related to fertility 
and positively related to investment in human capital, the overall conclusion is the 
same as above: economic growth increases as equality increases. 
We review theoretical studies for each of these four approaches in turn. 3 We 
also review some empirical studies that have attempted to support these theoretical 
studies. 
3The first two approaches are not the focus of this thesis but it is important to be aware of 
every possible channel through which inequality might affect growth. 
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2.3.1 The endogenous fiscal policy approach: Theory 
Here, we briefly review the model by Persson and Tabellini (1994). In their over-
lapping generations (OLG) model, agents have same preferences but have different 
incomes. The ith individual born in period t-1, indexed by t, maximises her utility 
i. 
Vt. 
v ~ == U ( c~ _ 1 , d~) , 
subject to the budget constraints: 
i + ki - i 
ct-i t - Yt-1, 
d~ == r [ ( 1 - 0 t) k~ + 0 t kt], 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
where, c is the consumption when young and d is the consumption when old. 
The utility function is concave, well-behaved, and homothetic .. k and ki are the 
average and individual stock of an asset, respectively, and the asset yields exogenous 
return of r. 0 is a redistributive policy variable. Equation (2.3) shows that the 
redistributive policy takes from individuals who accumulated the asset more than 
average and gives to those who accumulated less than average. 
Next, the income when young is defined as: 
Y:-1 == ( w + ei)kt-1, (2.4) 
where w is an average endowment of skills which is given exogenously, and e is an 
individual specific endowment of skills, which is also given exogenously, with zero 
mean and nonpositive median. 
This model assumes that there is one-period ahead commitment of policy, i.e., 
voters choose 0 before investors choose k. A politico-economic equilibrium is defined 
as a policy and a set of private economic decisions such that: 
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1. The economic decisions of all citizens are optimal, given the policy, and all 
markets clear ( economic equilibrium). 
2. The policy cannot be defeated by any alternative in a majority vote amorrgst 
the citizens who have their right to vote (political equilibrium). 
The economic equilibrium is obtained by solving a utility maximisation problem. 
It deduces that the growth rate of income (gt) is a function of 0 and the other 
variables as in Equation (2.5): 
9t == G( w, r, Bt) == wD(r, Bt) /[r + D(r, 0t)] - 1, (2.5) 
where D(r, 0t) == d~/ c~_ 1 . It can be shown that Gw > 0 and G8 < 0. This implies the 
higher the average skills are, the higher the growth rate is, and more importantly, 
the less 0 is, the higher the growth rate is. 
Regarding the political equilibrium, we first deduce the following equation using 
Equation (2.2), Equation (2.4), and the solution for c~_ 1 , which is obtained through 
solving individual's utility maximisation problem: 
-D(·)kt-1 i 
i --:--~:;--~ et-1 · kt - kt == D(-) + r(l - 0t) (2.6) 
Equation (2.6) says that individuals who are poorer (richer) than the average 
accumulate the asset less (more) than the average. Therefore, the level of 0 preferred 
by individuals is inversely related to their initial endowments of individually specific 
skills ( ei). The political equilibrium value of 0 is characterised by the value of gm 
which is preferred by the median voter, who has the median endowment of specific 
skills, em. 
Second, Equation (2.5), Equation (2.6), and the maximising condition: 
8vi [ i 8kt] BBt ==Ud(·) (kt-kt)+0tBBt r==O, (2.7) 
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yields the equilibrium value of 0*, which is a function of w, r, and em, defined 
implicitly by: 
D(r, 0)em 0D ( 0) wr - 0 
----+ e r, 2 - · 
D(r, 0) + r(l - 0) [r + D(r, 0)] (2.8) 
It is easy to verify 0; < 0. Combining Equation (2.5) and Equation (2.8), the 
growth rate in the politico-economic equilibrium is given as follows: 
g* == G(w,r,0*(w,r, em)). (2.9) 
From Equation (2.9), using Ge < 0 and 0; < 0, we can derive the following 
implication: More equality increases growth: 
dg* == Ge0e > O. 
dem (2.10) 
2.3.2 The endogenous fiscal policy approach: Evidence 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996) are the only empirical studies 
that are classified into this approach. The model by Persson and Tabellini (1994) 
predicts that more equality leads to less distortion and thus higher investment and 
economic growth. The equations they have estimated are as follows: 
GROWTH== {30 + {31GDP60 + {32 PSCHOOL + {33TRANSF, 
TRAN SF== ,o +,1 MIDDLE +,2 GDP60. 
They do not treat these equations as a system, so both equations are estimated 
separately by 01S. GROWTH is the average annual growth rate of the real GDP 
per capita over 1960-85. GDP60 is the real GDP per capita in 1960 and is in the 
first equation to capture the possible convergence effect. P SC HOOL is percentage 
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enrolled in primary school out of relevant age group in 1960, which is a proxy 
for the initial human capital. They measure government-induced redistribution by 
the average ratio of transfers (pensions, unemployment compensations, and other 
social expenditures other than health and education) to GDP between 1960 and 
1981 (TRANS F). Inclusion of this variable reduces the number of observations to 
13, which is very small. The measure of inequality is MIDDLE, which is the share 
of pre-tax income received by the third quintile of the population. An increase in 
MIDDLE is regarded as more equality. 
The estimation result is shown in Table 2.2. The data do not appear to support 
their hypothesis well. The estimate of the coefficient on MIDDLE of the second 
equation is negative as expected but is statistically insignificant. Also, the estimate 
of the coefficient on TRANS F of the first equation is negative as the model predicts 
but is statistically insignificant. 
Table 2.2: Persson and Tabellini ( 1994) 
constant GDP60 PSHCOOL TRANSF MIDDLE 
GROWTH 4.874 -0.00052 0.011 -4.742 
(3.414) ( -3.873) (0. 763) (-0.970) 
TRANSF 0.203 0.000018 -0.011 
(1.790) (1.756) ( -1.286) 
NB: Values in the parentheses are t statistics. 
Perotti (1996) estimates a system of equations by the method of two-stage least 
squares. The simplest specification of his system is as follows: 
GROWTH== /30 + /31GDP60 + /32MSE + /33F SE+ /34P PP I+ /3sMT AX 
MTAX == ,o + ,1GDP60 + ,2MIDDLE + 13POP65. 
In this system, GROWTH and MT AX are the endogenous variables. MT AX 
is the average marginal tax rate between 1970 and 1985, and this variable is a proxy 
for the distortions caused by the redistributive policy. MS E ( F SE) is average years 
of secondary schooling of the male (female) population in 1960, which is a proxy for 
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the initial human capital, and PPP I is a proxy for the market distortions for which 
the PPP value for the investment deflator relative to the United States in 1960 is 
used. As for the MT AX equation, the share of population over sixty-five years 
of age, average of 1970, 1975, and 1985 values (POP65) is included apart from 
GDP60 and MIDDLE, in order to control for a higher distributive expenditure 
to those people. 
The estimation result presented in Table 2.3 is not convincing in supporting the 
theory. The positive estimate of the coefficient on MT AX in the first equation is 
statistically significant, but i's against the prediction of the model. The negative 
estimate of the coefficient on MID in the second equation is anticipated but is 
statistically insignificant. The basic picture of the estimation result does not change 
if other fiscal policy variables or inequality measures are used instead. 
Table 2.3: Perotti (1996): The endogenous fiscal policy approach 
constant GDP60 MSE FSE PPP! MTAX 
GROWTH 0.004 -0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.0005 0.090 
(0.47) ·(-2.39) (0.38) (0.10) (-0.07) (3.61) 
constant GDP60 MIDDLE POP65 
MTAX 0.164 -0.021 -0.096 3.047 
(1.13) (-1.50) (-0.19) (3. 78) 
NB: Values in the parentheses are t statistics. 
2.3.3 The endogenous fiscal policy approach: Discussion 
We reviewed a one sector O LG model by Persson and Tabellini ( 1994). Here we 
hastily note the fact that two sector infinite horizon models by Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994) and Bertola (1993) arrived at the same conclusion: Inequality will stagnate 
economic growth via the endogenous fiscal policy determination and the resulting 
distortion. It shows the robustness of this approach in the sense that two different 
theoretical frameworks predict the same result. 
However, as we have reviewed, the empirical evidence appears to be against 
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what the theory predicts. Note that the important assumption of this approach 
is that policies are determined endogenously by a vote. Perhaps, as a number of 
studies have pointed out, this approach might prevail only in democratic countries, 
where this assumption sounds plausible. 
Perotti (1996) actually has conducted the same estimation only for the demo-
cratic country subsample,4 but the result has not improved so much to support 
the theory. 5 In addition to this, some empirical studies that use reduced-form 
equation have found that little support for the endogenous fiscal policy approach. 
For example, Deininger and Squire (1998) find that inequality affects growth in 
non-democratic countries, but not in democratic ones. 
In summary, we conclude that the data have not been supporting the endogenous 
fiscal approach so far. 
2.3.4 The sociopolitical instability approach: Theory 
Now we turn to review theoretical models of the second approach, which deals with 
sociopolitical instability. First, let us regard sociopolitical instability as a situation 
under which property rights are insecure, i.e., we assume that more inequality 
leads to more sociopolitical instability that leads to less secured property rights. 
Under this situation, rent-seeking activities will be more likely to take place than 
otherwise, and this may harm economic growth. Murphy et al. (1993) capture this 
point. 
Murphy et al. (1993) show how rent-seeking is costly to economic growth. It is 
shown that agents tend to engage in rent-seeking activities when property rights are 
not protected, and the level of output is far lower than otherwise. This situation is 
4A democracy index by Jodice and Taylor (1988) is used to classify economies into democratic 
and non-democratic countries. If an average value of it over 1960-85 is 0.5, then a country is 
classified as democratic. 
5Persson and Tabellini (1994) have only 13 observations for their estimation, so the similar 
kind of analysis is meaningless. 
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referred to as the "bad equilibrium," and since it is stable, it is difficult to escape 
from that equilibrium once an economy slides into there. 
Consider a farm economy where each agent can engage in one of the following 
three activities: production of a cash crop; production of a subsistence crop; rent-
seeking. A cash crop is traded in the market and the level of output per agent is 
q1 . But a cash crop is subject to rent-seeking. If an agent engages in rent-seeking, 
he can expropriate a cash crop by the maximum amount of q2 • On the contrary, a 
subsistence crop is not subject to rent-seeking and the level of output is q3 ( q3 < q1 ). 
Note that agent's rent-seeking technology is subject to diminishing returns, in the 
sense of an upper bound on how much he can grab with limited time and abilities. 
An equilibrium in this economy is an allocation of the population between cash 
crop production, subsistence crop production, and rent-seeking. Let us denote the 
ratio of people engaged in rent-seeking and cash crop production by n. We can find 
an equilibrium by considering payoffs to production and rent-seeking as a function 
of n. We first consider two extreme cases where property rights are extremely well 
protected and extremely poorly protected. 
Case 1. Well protected property rights ( q2 < q3 ): In this case, property rights 
are well protected because the return to rent-seeking is even lower than that 
to subsistence crop production. At n == 0, the returns to cash crop produc-
tion is q1 , since there is no rent-seeking. As n rises, returns to cash crop 
production falls to q1 - nq2 , until it hits the critical level q1 - n 1 q2, where 
q1 - n1 q2 == q3 ( or n1 == ( q1 - q3) / q2). As n rises above n 1, cash crop pro-
ducers drop into subsistence crop production to keep their income level at 
q3 . As a consequence, the return to each rent-seeker will be (q1 -q3 )/n < q2. 
Figure 2.1 describes the situation. The equilibrium is unique in this case. 
Every agent engages in cash crop production, there will be no rent-seekers or 
subsistence crop producers. Output per capita is q1 which is the highest this 
economy can yield. 
Case 2. Poorly protected property rights ( q1 < q2 ): In this case, rent-seekers 
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are able to grab more than the amount which cash crop producers can pro-
duce, hence property rights are not well protected at all. As shown in Fig-
ure 2.2, the ratio of population between rent-seekers and cash crop producers 
in the unique equilibrium, in this case, must be given by n 2 = ( q1 - q3) / q3, 
and in the equilibrium, every agent's income is equal to the subsistence level 
q3 , which is lower than q1 . 
Payoff 
ql 
Producers q 3 •·········· ..············· ........................................ . 
q2 
Rent -seekers 
0 n1 n 
Figure 2.1: Well protected property rights (Murphy et al., 1993) 
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Payoff 
q2 
ql 
Producers q 3 , ....... . 
Rent -seekers 
.. 
0 n I n 2 n 
Figure 2.2: Poorly protected property rights (Murphy et al., 1993) 
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Next, let us consider the intermediate case where the economy has multiple 
equilibria. 
Case 3. Intermediate Case - Multiple equilibria ( q3 < q2 < q1 ): In this case, 
the return to rent-seeking is greater than that to subsistence crop production 
but is less than that to cash crop production. There are three equilibria, as 
shown in Figure 2.3. The first one corresponds to that in Case 1 in which 
every agent engages in cash crop production, and income per capita is q1 . The 
second one corresponds to that in Case 2 where agents are split up to three 
activities, and the level of per capita output is driven down to the subsis-
tence level q3 . In the third equilibrium, agents engage in either rent-seeking 
or cash crop production, and per capita income is q2 . In this equilibrium, 
n == n 3 == ( q1 - q2 ) / q2 . However, this is not a stable equilibrium. An incre-
mental increase in n beyond n 3 raises the return to rent-seeking above that to 
cash crop production, hence leads to further increase in rent-seeking activity. 
There are two stable equilibria, "good" ( n == 0) and "bad" ( n == n 2 ), and one 
unstable equilibrium (n == n3 ). 
Some implications we can derive from the model are as follows: 
1. Well protected property rights (low q2 ) eliminates the "bad" equilibrium, 
whereas extremely poorly protected property rights (high q2 ) eliminates the 
"good" equilibrium. 
2. Raising q1 increases per capita income in the "good" equilibrium but it also 
increases the possibility that this equilibrium exists. It also implies an increase 
in n in the "bad" equilibrium since there are more rents to be disintegrated 
per producer before income falls down to q3 . 
3. Raising q3 increases per capita income in the "bad" equilibrium. 
4. To get the best outcome, it is essential to provide enough property rights 
so that q2 falls below q3 . To this end, a legal system, a rigid culture, or 
A review of the literature 24 
Payoff 
ql 
q2 
Producers q 3 r .. ················-·········· ............. _ .... _ ...................... . 
Rent -seekers 
0 n3 n1 n2 n 
Figure 2.3: Intermediate case (Murphy et al., 1993) 
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some other form of anti-rent-seeking ideology can play a role (North, 1981) 
to decrease q2 , or some protection of subsistence crop production, as well as 
raising its productivity (rise in q3 ), also plays an important role. 
5. Whatever the strategy to protect property rights, it should be quite drastic, 
since the "bad" equilibrium is stable and will not be affected by the minor 
improvement of property rights. 
In this crude model, the degree of security of property rights is given exogenously 
by the relative level of q2 • Therefore, in order to link between inequality and lower 
economic growth, we need to assume that in more unequal societies, agents are more 
likely to be involved in rent seeking activities. Some may say it is an acceptable 
assumption in modelling sociopolitical instability, but others may say it is too 
strong. So, let us look at another model by Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) who 
have dealt with sociopolitical instability in a different way. 
Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) model sociopolitical instability in a different 
way by endogenising the social conflict between two groups, namely, the rich and 
the poor. In their game theoretic model, they characterise these groups as two 
players, and show that the poor can undertake redistributive actions which leads 
to lower investment and thus lower output in subsequent periods. 
Consider the two players, 1 and 2, who live for infinite periods. They have an 
identical utility function, with an identical discount rate /3 E (0, 1 ): 
U(c) == cl-€ 
"1 ' 
(2.11) 
where O < E < 1 and c is the level of consumption. The level of output (y) depends 
only on the level of capital stock ( k) in each period, and the production function 
is given as follows: 
Y == ak 
' 
(2.12) 
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where a > 0. Current period's output (yt) is either consumed by the two players 
( c;, c;) or invested to form the capital stock in the next period ( kt+l): 
Yt - c; - c; < kt+1. (2 .13) 
The total utility of each player among a first best equilibrium in derived by solving 
the following dynamic programme: 
V== max C +/Jv(y-2c) . [ 
1-€ ] 
O<c<2l 1 - E 
- -2 
It follows that the first best consumption is given as follows : 
" c==>..y, 
where 
" 1 ( 1 1-e) ). == 
2 
1 - /3; a-e > 0. 
" For the first best >.., the value function is given by: 
" (') 1-€ V==SAY ' 
where 
;1-€ 
s(-\) = (l - E){ 1 -/3 ( a(l -25-)) }' 
(2 .14) 
(2.15) 
(2.16) 
(2 .17) 
(2.18) 
This result shows that in a first best equilibrium, in each period, each agent will 
consume an equal share of output, but will not consume all output and invest the 
rest for the next period. 
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Next, let us consider the case where a player defects against a first best play by 
her opponent. If a player defects, the other player will take a grim trigger strategy, 
i.e., all output will be consumed in equal shares by the two players after a defection. 
Therefore, this player must choose her consumption in the current period taking 
into account that a grim trigger strategy will be enacted subsequently. 
Similar to the first best case, optimal defection value is given by: 
vD == max 
O~cv ~(1->.)y 
cb-e +;,{a((l-~)y-cD)/2} 
1-E 1-E 
(2.19) 
and the value of optimal defection from the first best ( vD) is derived as follows: 
where 
sD == 
and 
D 1-€ 
v == SDY , 
1 
A ' (1 - A) 1-€(1 - E)M€ 
M == 2a 
({3a) l 2 e + ~ 2 
(2.20) 
(2.21) 
(2.22) 
If v > vD then the first best outcome prevails, but otherwise, a defection will 
be taken place. In the numerical example in Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), if 
the first best was sustained, capital stock would grow at 15 per cent. However, 
economy would contract by 0.0015 per cent if there was a defection. 6 
Inequality is characterised by the disparity of the levels of consumption between 
two players. Therefore, when a defection is present, i.e., v < vD, inequality is 
6The following parameter values are used: a == 3.3, b == 0.325, e == 0.5. 
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present because the player who defects consumes more than the other one. The 
disadvantaged player will undertake a redistributive action, namely, a grim trigger 
strategy. In this model, this leads to a slower accumulation of capital and hence 
slower economic growth. 
2.3.5 The sociopolitical instability approach: Evidence 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Perotti (1996) are the only empirical studies that 
have attempted to support this approach. Alesina and Perotti (1996) test the hy-
pothesis that inequality affects investment via destabilising the sociopolitical sta-
tus. To this end, they specify a bivariate simultaneous equation model, with share 
of physical investment in GDP (INV) and the index of sociopolitical instability 
(SP I) as endogenous variables. In the simplest specification, variables on the RHS 
of the I NV equation are as follows: SP I, the initial level of real GDP per capita to 
take the convergence effect in to account, and indexes to capture domestic market 
price distortions (PP PI and PPP IDE: PPP I was defined previously; PPP IDE 
is a magnitude of the deviation of the PPP value for the investment deflator from 
the sample mean in 1960). On the RHS of the SP I equation, I NV, the initial 
enrolment ratio in primary school as a proxy for human capital (PRIM), and the 
index of equality (MI DC LASS) are included. In this paper, this equality index is 
a share of the third and fourth quintiles of the population. The higher the value 
of this index is, more equal is the economy. The simplest system of equations they 
have estimated is as follows: 
I NV== f3o + f31GDP60 + f32SP I+ {33P PP I+ {34P PP I DE 
SP I== ,o + r1P RIM+ ,2MIDCLASS + ,3I NV. 
The estimation is conducted by the method of two-stage least squares, which 
gives efficient and consistent estimates. The result is shown in Table 2.4. The signs 
of all coefficients are as expected. Our interest is the estimate of the coefficient 
on MI DC LASS, which is negative and statistically significant. A one standard 
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deviation increase in MI DC LASS decreases SP I by about 5. 7, which corresponds 
to about 48 per cent of its standard deviation. This is associated with an increase 
in I NV about 2.85 percentage points. Provided that the standard deviation of 
I NV is 7.49, the effect of initial inequality upon investment appears non-trivial. 
This estimation result is shown to be robust against different model specifications 
and a different measure of SP I. 
Table 2.4: Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
constant GDP60 SPI PPPI PPP IDE 
INV 27.36 0.07 -0.50 -0.14 0.04 
(9.34) (1.09) (-2.39) (-2.39) (0.62) 
constant PRIM MI DC LASS INV 
SPI 37.43 -0 .23 -1.01 0.72 
( 4.54) (-2.45) (-3.42) (1. 30) 
NB: Values in the parentheses are t statistics. 
Now we turn to look at Perotti (1996 ) who specifies the system slightly differ-
ently. The simplest specification of the system is as follows: 
GROWTH== /3o + {31GDP60 + {32MSE + {33 FSE + {34 P PP I+ {35 SP I 
SP I== 1o + 11MSE + 12FSE + 13M I DDLE. 
The definition of the variables are the same as before. The difference from 
Alesina and Perotti (1 996 ) is that GROWTH instead of I NV is used in the first 
equation of this system. Perotti (1 996 ) does not explicitly justify why he has 
used the growth rate instead of the investment ratio, and this could be a potential 
problem, which will we come back to discuss in the next subsection. 
In any case, the estimation result is shown in Table 2.5. The estimate of the 
coefficient on MIDDLE in the second equation is negative as anticipated and is 
statistically significant. In addition, the estimate of the coefficient on SP I in the 
first equation is negative as the model predicts and is statistically significant. This 
estimation predicts that a one standard deviation increase in MI DD LE decreases 
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SP I by about 0.005 and, in turn, leads to an increase in GROWTH by about 0.7 
percentage point. 
Table 2.5: Perotti (1996): The sociopolitical instability approach 
constant GDP60 MSE FSE PPP! SPI 
GROWTH 0.034 -0.004 0.028 -0.025 -0.014 -1.495 
(3.46) ( -1.81) (2.63) (-2.05) ( -1.32) (-2.27) 
constant MSE FSE MIDDLE 
SPI 0.021 0.006 -0.009 0.090 
(3.26) (1.20) (-1.20) (-2.11) 
NB: Values in the parentheses are t statistics. 
Inclusion of regional dummies does not change the picture much. The estimate 
of the coefficient on MIDDLE falls to -0.071 but is still statistically significant, 
which implies that the variation in SP I is explained by the continental differences, 
but only partly. This case, a one standard deviation increase in MIDDLE leads 
to an increase in GROWTH by about 0.56 percentage point. In any event, the 
effect of inequality upon growth appears to be sizable. 
2.3.6 The sociopolitical instability approach: Discussion 
The basic intuition behind this approach is that, in an unequal society, there is 
strong incentive for the different groups to engage in unproductive activities in 
order to deprive other groups' output, and this results in uncertainty on the final 
distribution of output, which induces a decrease in investment in physical capi-
tal. Therefore, the relationship between inequality and investment is derived quite 
rigourously from the theoretical model. The empirical study by Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) has tested this link and support it quite well as we have seen. Inequality 
has a sizable impact upon investment. 
However, we are still not sure about the effect of inequality upon growth. Many 
of the studies have found a strongly positive and statistically significant relationship 
between investment and growth. However, as it is well known, Barro and Sala-i-
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Martin (1995) report the opposite evidence that investment does not have much 
explanatory power for growth. Therefore, we need to be a little cautious when we 
link investment and growth. 
A possible way to get around this problem is to estimate a three-equation sys-
tem. In addition to two equations of a system in Alesina and Perotti (1996), if we 
add a typical growth equation with the growth rate on the LHS and investment 
on the RHS as the third equation, we can estimate the effect of inequality upon 
growth, indirectly through investment. 
Perotti (1996) skips this procedure and just replaces I NV with GROWTH. 
This slight departure from the theoretical n1odel makes the interpretation of the 
results very difficult. That is, from his estimation, we cannot really observe how 
sociopolitical instability is affecting growth. 
Despite the problem raised above, Perotti (1996) provides us with an interesting 
finding. In his estimation, SP I is used to capture sociopolitical instability, but 
there is an awkward question what SP I is really capturing - it might be just a 
proxy variable for Latin American/ African countries where sociopolitical instability 
is often present. Interestingly, as we have seen, inclusion of regional dummies to 
Perotti (1996) does not change the result much. It shows that the variation in SP I 
is only partly explained by the regional differences. Furthermore, the estimate on 
the coefficient of MIDDLE remains statistically significant . 
This contrasts to some reduced-form regressions such as Birdsall et al. ( 1995). 
When regional dummies are introduced to their reduced-form regression, inequal-
ity becomes statistically insignificant. Ravallion and Chen (1997) also report the 
similar finding. Whilst these findings suggest the relationship between inequality 
and growth might be spurious, Perotti (1996) presents the opposite result . 
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2.3. 7 The human capital and borrowing constraint approach: 
Theory 
The third approach is characterised by two assumptions. One is that the credit 
market is imperfect and the other is that investment in human capital is indivisible, 
i.e., there is a decision whether or not to invest in human capital but there is no 
decision on how much to invest. Galor and Zeira (1993) show that under this 
circumstance, an economy that has a larger middle class is likely to grow faster. A 
brief review of their model is as follows. 
We consider a small open economy. There is only one good that can be used for 
either consumption or investment. There are two ways to produce this good. One 
is to utilise both capital (Kt) and skilled labour (L:), and the other is to utilise 
only unskilled labour (L~). The levels of output Y/ and ½n are given as follows: 
½s == F( Kt, L:), 
½n == WnL;, 
(2.23) 
(2.24) 
where Wn is the competitive wage rate determined in the unskilled labour market, 
and F is a concave CRS production function. 
We consider individuals who live for two periods. In the first period, each 
individual decides whether to work or to invest in human capital. If she invests in 
human capital, she can work as a skilled labour in the second period, but if she 
does not invest in human capital she works as an unskilled labour in the second 
period. Each individual consumes only in the second period and bequeaths for her 
child. The utility function is given as follows: 
U == odog c + ( 1 - a) log b, (2.25) 
where c is consumption in the second period, b is bequest, and a is a parameter 
which takes a value between O and 1. 
A review of the literature 33 
Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile and the constant world interest rate 
is given by r > 0. It follows that: 
8F 
8Kt == r , (2.26) 
and this equation determines the wage rate for skilled labour, W 5 • 
Now, we turn to the capital market. Individuals can lend any amount at the 
world interest rate r. We assume that borrowers are able to evade paying the debt 
by all means and lenders are trying to keep track of borrowers. If it costs z to 
keep track of borrowers, it costs f3z to evade paying the debt, where /3 > 1. If an 
individual borrows an amount of d at the interest rate id , a zero profit condition in 
the competitive financial sector yields: 
did== dr + z . (2.27) 
Taking into account that lenders choose z high enough to make the default disad-
vantageous, we obtain the following result: 
id == i == 1 + f3r /3 - l > T. (2.28) 
This equation says that the borrowing interest rate , i , is higher than the lending 
interest rate, r. In this sense, the capital market is imperfect. 
Now, let us analyse optimal decisions by individuals. Individuals are identi-
cal except that they inherit a different amount of wealth, and we can think of 
three types of individuals; individuals who remains unskilled; individuals who lend 
and invest in human capital; individuals who borrow and invest in human capital. 
Solving the utility maximisation problems for these three types of individuals who 
inherit an amount of x in the first period gives the optimal amount of bequest for 
each type, respectively, as follows: 
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bn == (l - a) [(1 +r)(x +wn) +wn], 
b sl == ( 1 - a) [ w s + ( x - h) ( 1 + r)] , 
b sb == ( 1 - a) [ W s + ( X - h) ( 1 + i)] , 
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(2.29) 
(2.30) 
(2.31) 
where h is the cost of investing in human capital. Therefore in Equation (2.30), 
(x-h) is non-negative, but is negative in Equation (2.31). We confine our analysis 
to the case where lenders prefer to invest in human capital, i.e., we assume that 
the following relationship holds: 
W5 -h(l +r) > wn(2 +r). (2.32) 
This relationship can be easily derived by comparing utilities of an unskilled in-
dividual and a skilled individual who lends. It can also be shown that borrowers 
prefer to invest in human capital as long as the resulting utility is higher than 
otherwise, i.e., they invest in human capital as long as the following relationship 
holds: 
X > f == Wn(2 + r) + h(l + i) _ Ws 
i-r 
(2.33) 
The important implication here is that education is limited to individuals with high 
enough initial wealth ( above f). This is due to a higher interest rate for borrowers. 
Now we turn to analyse the dynamics of the model. The distribution of inheri-
tances in the next period ( Xt+l) are as follows: 
bn == (1- a) [(1 +r)(xt +wn) +wn] if Xt < J 
Xt+l == \ bsb == (l - a) [ws + (xt - h)(l + i)] if J < Xt < h (2.34) 
bsz==(l-a)[ws+(xt-h)(l+r )] ifh<xt 
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Figure 2.4: Dynamics of inheritance (Galor and Zeira, 1993) 
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Figure 2.4 describes the situation. The curves in Figure 4 describe the dynamic 
relationships between inheritance and bequest (inheritance for the next generation) 
for three types of individuals. 
Points A and B are locally stable and they correspond to the long run levels of 
inheritance for skilled individuals (xs) and unskilled individuals (x-n); respectively. 
The critical point in Figure 4 is Point C. Individuals who inherit less than g in 
period t may invest in human capital, but eventually their descendants will become 
unskilled and their inheritances will converge to x-n- On the other hand, individuals 
who inherit more than g in period t invest in human capital and their descendants 
will become skilled throughout the subsequent generations. Their inheritances will 
converge to Xs. 
Therefore, in the long run, this economy is divided into two groups - skilled 
individuals who have wealth Xs and unskilled individuals who have wealth X-n- The 
relative size of these groups depends upon the initial wealth distribution since the 
number of ( un )skilled individual in the long run is the same as the number of 
individuals who inherit less than g initially in period t. 
Galor and Zeira (1993) then casually argue the following. If we assume that 
productivity of unskilled individual ( wn) grows at a certain rate and productivity 
of skilled individual ( w s) and human capital ( h) grow at a higher rate, then the 
growth rate of output per capita is a weighted average of these rates where initial 
wealth distribution is used as the weight. Therefore, initial wealth distribution can 
affect the rate of growth. The more there are individuals who inherit more than 
g, in other words, the larger the share of the middle class, the higher the growth 
rate will be. This argument is, however, problematic. We come back to this after 
reviewing a related empirical study. 
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2.3.8 The human capital and borrowing constraint approach: 
Evidence 
Perotti (1996) is the only empirical study that is based upon this approach. The 
simplest specification of a simultaneous equation system is as follows: 
GROWTH== /30 + /31GDP60 + /32F SEC 
FSEC == ,o + ,1GDP60 + ,2MSE + r3FSE + r4MIDDLE. 
Perotti (1996) chooses F SEC, the female secondary school enrolment ratio 
(average of 1965 and 1985 values), as a proxy for investment in human capital since 
the opportunity cost of secondly education is much likely to be higher than that of 
primary education. The result is basically the same if MS EC, the male secondary 
school enrolment ratio ( average of 1965 and 1985 values), is used instead of F SEC. 
The estimation result is shown in Table 2.6, which appears to be consistent with 
what the theoretical model predicts. The positive estimate of the coefficient on 
MIDDLE in the second equation implies that in a more equal society investment 
in human capital will be higher, and the positive estimate of the coefficient on 
F SEC in the first equation implies a positive effect of investment in human capital 
on growth. A one standard deviation increase in MIDDLE leads to about 0.63 
percentage point increase in GROWTH. Again, we emphasise that this effect is 
sizable. A standard deviation of GROWTH in this sample is 0.017. 
Table 2.6: Perotti (1996): The human capital and borrowing constraint approach 
constant GDP60 FSEC 
GROWTH 0.002 -0.013 0.111 
(0.26) (-4.68) (5.24) 
constant GDP60 MSE FSE MIDDLE 
FSEC -0.212 0.088 0.235 -0.155 1.078 
(-1.61) (5.86) (2.95) (-1.80) (2.51) 
NB: Values in the parentheses are t statistics. 
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However, this estimation has nothing to do with the borrowing constraint, i.e., 
the imperfect capital market . In order to take this into account, a measure that can 
capture the degree of imperfection in the capital market is needed. Perotti (1996) 
reports no ideal data exist for this purpose at present. 
2.3.9 The human capital and borrowing constraint approach: 
Discussion 
We have reviewed a model by Galor and Zeira (1993), but it is problematic in 
at least two respects. One is their argument in deriving the implication for the 
effect of inequality upon growth in transition. In deriving the implication, they 
impose an assumption that both the wage rates for two types of workers and the 
cost for investment in human capital grow. However, the model has been solved 
without this assumption. The optimal behaviour of the individuals will change if 
this assumption is imposed, so strictly speaking, the model should be constructed 
and solved with this assumption imposed from the beginning. 
The other problem is their definition of inequality. We have kept it a little vague 
what it means by inequality in their model, but they use the share of unskilled in-
dividuals in the total population ( zu) to define inequality. They define that an 
economy is more unequal if this share is higher. This definition, however, is obvi-
ously different from the ordinary inequality definitions such as the Gini coefficient. 
If every individual is unskilled and has the same income, the Gini coefficient will 
be zero, showing complete equity of an economy. But according to the definition 
by Galor and Zeira (1993), this economy is completely unequal because the share 
of unskilled individuals is unity. 
Let us turn to discuss a possible extension of the model - including endogenous 
fertility. Becker et al. (1990) point out that investment in human capital is jointly 
determined by individuals, as they are interpreted as two alternative uses of parents' 
human capital. Parents face a trade-off between investing in the number of children 
and investing in children's education, given their budget constraint. In fact, fertility 
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has been treated as an endogenous variable in some growth models (Barro and 
Becker, 1989, Becker and Barro, 1988, Becker et al., 1990). 
The empirical evidence also gives us a fair reason to incorporate fertility into 
a growth model. Brander and Dowrick (1994), using a 107 country panel data set 
covering 1960-85, detect strong negative fertility effects upon per capita income 
growth. Their study also points out the significant negative relationship between 
fertility and human capital. Barro (1991) also finds a strong negative relationship 
between fertility and investment in human capital. 
This leads us to investigate the fourth approach - the endogenous fertility ap-
proach. 
2.3.10 The endogenous fertility approach: Theory 
Unfortunately, there is no formal theoretical study that can be genuinely classified 
into this approach. A theoretical model that captures the idea most can be found 
in Galor and Zang (1997) in which they incorporate exogenous fertility into a model 
by Galor and Zeira (1993) we previously reviewed. 
In Galor and Zeira (1993), each individual has only one child as in other typical 
OLG models. In order to incorporate the fertility rate, Galor and Zang (1997) 
assume that each individual has n children and the bequest from their ancestor is 
equally allocated to them. By virtue of this , we are able to analyse the effect of 
the change inn, although it is given exogenously. 
Unlike in Galor and Zeira (1993) individuals cannot work as unskilled labour 
in the first period. It is assumed that in the first period individuals only make a 
choice whether or not they invest in human capital. In the model, imperfection 
of the capital market is characterised by the assumption that individuals cannot 
borrow at all to finance their education. Hence, if an individual inherits wealth that 
is less than the cost to invest in human capital, she is not able to be a skilled worker 
in the second period. And the model focuses on the situation where individuals who 
inherit more than the cost to invest in human capital are better off if they invest 
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in human capital. An assumption that investment in human capital is indivisible 
is present in this model as well. 
The dynamics of bequest per child in the model of Galor and Zang (1997) is 
described as follows: 
bt+l 
n 
! ( 1 - a) [ ~ ( 1 + T) + Wn] 
!(1-a) [(~-h) (l+r) +ws] 
if bt < h 
n 
if bt > h 
(2.35) 
n -
where the definition of all symbols are the same as in the previous section. Since 
the assumption on the capital market is stronger, we only have to consider two 
cases. Figure 2.5 describes the situation. f.s in Galor and Zeira (1993), in the long 
run, this economy is divided into two groups of individuals, and the relative size of 
these groups depends upon initial wealth distribution. ~ 
From here they go one step further than Galor and Zeira ( 1993). In order to 
examine the effect of inequality and the family size upon growth, they derive the 
growth rate between two consecutive periods during transition. 
After some tedious calculation from Equation (2.35), it can be shown that per-
family income (y) in period t + l is: 
Yt+i = [(1 - a)(l + r): + Wn] + z:+l [(w, - wn) - h(l + r)], (2.36) 
where lt+i is the share of skilled workers in period t + l. The growth rate of 
per-family income (g) is, therefore: 
9t == Yt+l - Yt 
Yt 
(1- a)(l +r) - l + Wn + lf+1 [(ws -wn)-h(l +r)]. 
n Yt Yt 
(2.37) 
The share of skilled workers in period t+ l, lt+i, is determined by the distribution 
of inheritances per-child born in period t, and it depends upon the per-family 
income (y), the family size or fertility (n), the income distribution (Q) and the cost 
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Figure 2.5: Dynamics of bequest per child ( Galor and Zang, 1997) 
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of human capital investment (h). Q is a measure of inequality and higher Q implies 
greater inequality. 7 Now we have the following relationship: 
Zt+i == Zt+i (Yt, n, Q, h). (2.38) 
Together with Equation (2.37), it follows: 
9t == G(yt,n,Q,e,h), (2.39) 
where e is 'basic' education that every individual obtains when they are young, so 
both Wn and Ws depend positively upon e. 
Taking first-order approximation of Equation (2.39) yields the following: 
9t == Gnn + GqQ + GytYt +Gee+ Ghh + Ut. (2.40) 
Galor and Zang (1997) then mathematically show that Gq < 0, i.e., the growth 
rate of an economy is higher, the more equally initial income is distributed. They 
also show that Gn < 0, i.e., the growth rate of an economy is higher, the lower the 
rate of fertility is. 
2.3.11 The endogenous fertility approach: Evidence 
Following Equation (2.40), Galor and Zang (1997) specify their econometric model 
as follows: 
GROWTH== {30 + (31F ERT + f32GI NI+ {33GDP60 
+~PSCHOOL+~PUBED~ 
where GIN I is the Gini coefficient and PU BEDU is the average public expenditure 
ratio relative to GNP for the period 1960-1983. The estimation result is presented 
7This definition is problematic. We will discuss this issue shortly. 
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in Table 2. 7. It is consistent with the empirical implication of the model: given 
the rate of fertility, the more equal an economy is , the higher is the growth rate; 
given income distribution, the lower the rate of fertility is, the higher is the growth 
rate. Estimates of all the coefficients have anticipated signs and are statistically 
significant at at least 5 per cent. 
Table 2. 7: Galor and Zang (1997) 
constant FERT GINI GDP60 PSCHOOL PUBEDU 
GROWTH 3.2038 -0.2547 -3 .9620 
(3.190) (-2.182) (-2.211) 
NB: Values in the parentheses are t statistics. 
-0.2011 
( -6.056 ) 
0.0293 
( 4.806) 
0.1785 
(1.820) 
Regarding the magnitude of effect of fertility and inequality upon growth, a 
reduction of the net fertility rate by a point lead to an increase in GROWTH by 
about 0.25 percentage point and a one standard deviation decrease in GIN I leads 
to an increase in GROWTH by 0.32 percentage point. Again , let us emphasise 
that these effects are not negligible. 
Their estimation shows that both fertility and inequality have significant effect 
upon economic growth. However, they do not deal with a system of equations as 
fertility is given exogenously in their model. In this sense, their result does not tell 
us anything about the joint decision on fertility and investment in human capital. 
Perotti (1996) goes one step further in this respect, and estimates the following 
system of equations. 
GROWTH== f3o + f31GDP60 + f32P PP I+ /33 F ERT 
FERT == "Yo +""'!1GDP60 +""'!2MSE +""'f3 FSE +""'f4MJDDLE, 
where F ERT is the net fertility rate average of 1965 and 1985 values .8 The esti-
mation result (Table 2.8) appears consistent with what the theory predicts. The 
8The net fertility rate is constructed as the total fertility rate multiplied by (1 minus infant 
mortality rate in the first year of life). 
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negative estimate of the coefficient on MIDDLE in the second equation is as an-
ticipated and is statistically significant. The estimate of the coefficient on FE RT 
in the first equation is negative and statistically significant, which implies that the 
growth rate will be higher, the lower the fertility rate is. A one standard deviation 
increase in MIDDLE decreases F ERT by about 0.55, which in turn increases 
GROWTH by approximately 0.87 percentage point. This magnitude is about a 
half of its standard deviation, which is not negligible. 
Table 2.8: Perotti (1996): The endogenous fertility approach 
-
constant GDP60 PPP! FERT 
GROWTH 0.101 -0.010 0.011 -0.016 
(6.27) (-4.45) (1.29) (-5.10) 
constant GDP60 MSE FSE MIDDLE 
FERT 8.903 -0.466 -1.380 1.368 -10.310 
(11.92) ( -5.63) ( -3.1~) (2.92) (-4.24) 
NB: Values in the parentheses are t statistics. 
Perotti (1996) then adds female secondary school enrolment ratio ( F SEC) to 
the second equation. When F SEC is controlled for, the estimate of the coefficient 
on MIDDLE falls by approximately 40 per cent to -5.858. Perotti (1996) argues 
that this implies the joint determination of fertility and the secondary school en-
rolment ratio (investment in human capital) as the model suggests, because this 
is showing fair part of FE RT is explained by the effect of MIDDLE thorough 
FSEC. 9 
9 Perotti (1996) also estimates the system where the first equation includes F SEC instead of 
F ERT and the dependent variable of the second equation is F SEC. In this case, when F ERT 
is controlled for in the second equation, MIDDLE has no explanatory power for F SEC. We 
further discuss this issue in Chapter 5. 
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2.3.12 The endogenous fertility approach: Discussion 
Theoretical contribution of Galor and Zang (1997) is twofold. First, they derived 
the growth rate between two periods during transition, in order to observe the effect 
of inequality upon growth. This allows them to overcome the first problem in Galor 
and Zeira (1993) we previously pointed out. 
Second, more importantly, Galor and Zang (1997) have attempted to incorpo-
rate fertility into the model by Galor and Zeira (1993). This has allowed them to 
come up with an econometric model including the fertility rate, which has enabled 
them to see the effect of fertility upon growth. The rate of fertility is, however, still 
given exogenously, in which case neither their theoretical nor econometric model 
capture the idea of the joint fertility and education decision. 
However, Galor and Zang (1997) has not overcome the second problem in Galor 
and Zeira - the problem of defining inequality. They use inequality variable Q 
in their paper and mathematically show that growth is negatively related to this 
variable. However, this hinges upon the assumption they impose:10 
8lt+1 < o. 
8Q 
In order for this to hold in general, we need to use the same definition of in-
equality as in Galor and Zeira (1993). 
Let us turn to discuss the empirical side. Aside from Galor and Zang (1997), 
we have reviewed a study by Perotti (1996). He specifies a system of equations 
in an ad hoc manner and has attempted to support the endogenous fertility ap-
proach. However, his estimation is problematic in the following sense. In specifying 
his econometric model, Perotti (1996) has a strong prior belief that fertility and 
investment in human capital are jointly determined. However, the way he has con-
trolled for F SEC contradicts to this prior belief, i.e., F SEC is treated exogenous 
to the system. If fertility and schooling decisions are made jointly, the system 
10This is Equation (33) in Galor and Zang (1997) 
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should be estimated with both F ERT and FSEC being treated as endogenous 
variables. 
Aside from this, a couple of issues regarding human capital are worth discussing. 
Note that female education is used in all estimations we introduced. However, it is 
under dispute which variable should be used as a proxy for human capital. 11 In fact, 
Perotti (1996) also estimates the system using male education and reports that, 
rather surprisingly, any significant changes are observed between the estimation 
results. 
Note also that in all the empirical studies we have reviewed, the flow of human 
capital, i.e., the enrolment ratio, is used in the growth equation. In other empirical 
studies such as Barro and Lee (1994), in contrast, the stock of human capital, 
i.e., the average years of schooling, is used in the growth equation. The choice of 
which variable to use usually has to do with the theoretical model underlying the 
econometric model. In Gal or and Zang ( 1997), the flow of human capital ( e) is 
used since they try to explain growth between two periods in transition. However, 
it is not clear why the flow of human capital is employed in Perotti (1996) in which 
the econometric model is specified in an ad hoc manner .12 
2.4 Concluding remarks: Contribution to the lit-
erature 
We have reviewed both the theoretical and the empirical literature. A number of 
reduced form regressions present a negative relationship between inequality and 
growth, which challenge the conventional view that inequality is good for growth. 
Four strands of theoretical approaches have been proposed to explain this negative 
relationship. Corresponding to these theoretical studies, some empirical studies, 
but not many, have been conducted in order to support them. 
11This will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
12This issue will also be further discussed in Chapter 5. 
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From reviewing theoretical and empirical studies by different approach, it ap-
pears that there is still plenty of room for further research both theoretically and 
empirically. Theories possess shortcomings that have to be overcome. Empirical 
studies that estimate a system of equations are rare. Estimation results are not 
particularly in favour of the theories they intend to support and some estimation 
appears to contain serious problems as discussed. 
This thesis, from the four approaches, focuses upon the endogenous fertility 
approach. As we have seen, no theoretical model that deals simultaneously with 
inequality, endogenous fertility, investment in human capital, and growth is present. 
Our theoretical models in the following two chapters do deal simultaneously with 
these four economic factors, which is the principal theoretical contribution of this 
thesis to the literature. 
In the next chapter, we further extend models by Galor and Zeira (1993) and 
Galor and Zang (1997) to incorporate endogenous fertility. As in these two previous 
studies, however, the way we will define inequality is still problematic in the next 
chapter. Furthermore, an economy in this framework turns out to be destined 
to exhibit negative growth, which is unrealistic. We will conclude that this is an 
inevitable consequence in this kind of framework where two steady states exist. 
Hence, Chapter 4 attempts to deal simultaneously with the above four eco-
nomic factors using a different framework. We incorporate inequality into a study 
by Ehrlich and Lui (1991) where they model endogenous fertility, investment in 
human capital, and growth. The new feature here is that we use an endogenous 
growth framework. Depending upon parameter values, this model produces dif-
ferent growth regimes with different long run growth rates, so an economy can 
exhibit positive growth under certain conditions. In Chapter 4, instead of using 
the problematic definition of inequality we have seen in this chapter, we employ the 
coefficient of variation of output per worker as a measure of inequality. We use nu-
merical simulations to derive an implication for the relationship between inequality 
and growth. 
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We also contribute to the empirical literature. In Chapter 5, we test our conjec-
ture derived from our theoretical model. It conjectures that the effect of inequality 
upon growth is non-monotonic, in contrast to what the existing reduced form stud-
ies have found. We construct a structural econometric model based upon our the-
oretical implication from Chapter 4 so that we can interpret the estimation result 
clearly. Fertility and investment in human capital are both treated as endogenous 
variables in the system, unlike in Perotti (1996). We conduct a formal test for 
endogeneity and confirm that fertility and education are determined jointly. The 
non-monotonic nature of the effect of inequality upon growth is supported by the 
data, which questions the common agreement that inequality impedes growth in 
all cases. 
Chapter 3 
Endogenising fertility 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter incorporates endogenous fertility into models of inequality, invest-
ment in human capital, and growth, such as Galor and Zeira (1993). The chapter 
is structured as follows. The model is described in the following section. Section 3.3 
describes the dynamics of the economy. In Section 3.4, a negative relationship be-
tween economic growth (in transition) and initial inequality is derived. Section 3.5 
discusses some problems that arise from the model. 
3.2 The model 
Consider a small open economy where there is only one good, which can be used 
for either consumption or investment. We assume a constant returns to scale pro-
duction technology. The output of the good in Period t (Yt) is given as follows: 
Yt == F( Kt, ANt) == ANtf (kt), (3.1) 
where Kt and Nt are physical capital and labour utilised in Period t, ANt is effective 
labour, and kt is physical capital per effective labour. We assume that f behaves 
nicely, i.e. f is positive, strictly concave and monotonic, and satisfying the Inada 
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conditions. The productivity parameter, >., depends upon whether an individual is 
educated or uneducated. We will come back to this matter later. 
We assume that physical capital is perfectly mobile across countries and the 
constant world interest rate is given by f > 0. It is also assumed that both the 
goods and labour markets are competitive. The rate of interest ( r) and the wage 
rate per effective labour ( w) therefore are given as follows: 
r == J' (kt) == J' ( k), 
w == J(k) - J'(k)k. 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
We consider individuals who live for two periods in overlapping generations. Let 
us consider an individual who is born in Period t. When she is born, her parent 
decides whether she receives education. From the middle of Period 1 to the middle 
of Period 2, she works as a skilled worker if she has received education but works 
as an unskilled worker if otherwise. We assume she receives her ,;,vage in advance 
when she starts working. 
Each individual has one unit of effective labour when she is born, and if she does 
not receive education it remains intact. Individuals who have received education 
have more units of effective labour, 0 > l, which is assumed to be constant over 
time. More formally, we can write this relationship as follows: 
1 if not educated 
>- == I (3.4) 
0 > l if educated. 
The wage rates of unskilled and skilled workers, therefore, are w and w0, respec-
tively. She cannot, however, utilise all her earnings by herself. We assume that 
there is a custom, which people will follow, that she gives a certain ratio ( o) of her 
earnings to her parent. 
At the end of Period 1, she receives bequest (bt-i) from her parent. Together 
with her earnings from work, at the beginning of Period 2, she decides whether to 
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have one educated child or to have many uneducated children. To give education 
to her child, she has to pay h > 0, which is assumed to be constant over time. We 
assume that h goes to infinity from the second child, i.e., there is no incentive for 
a parent to have two educated children. It is also assumed that a parent does not 
have one educated child and other uneducated children at the same time. The cost 
of rearing children depends upon the number of children (nt), and we denote it by 
g(nt), where g is positive, strictly convex, and monotonic. She saves her remaining 
earnings and will receive it with interest at the end of Period 2. 
Since there is a custom for children to support their parent, which all children 
will follow, she receives support from her child( ren) in the middle of Period 2. At 
the end of Period 2, she decides how much to consume and how much to bequeath 
to her offspring. Her utility stems from her consumption and her bequest, both 
determined by her at the end of Period 2, and it is represented by the Cobb-Douglas 
utility function as follows: 
U == odog c + ( 1 - a) log B. (3.5) 
where c is consumption in Period 2, Bis total bequest which will be equally divided 
amongst all children, and a is a parameter which takes a value between O and 1.1 
Now let us analyse optimal decisions by individuals. Consider an individual who 
receives bt-l from her parent and earns Zt. Let us call bt-l + (1- 5)zt her disposable 
income and denote it by Xt. If she can afford to let her child receive education, her 
expected income in the middle of Period 2 will be: 
[xt - (g(l) + h)] (1 + f) + 5w0, (3.6) 
and her expected utility at the end of Period 2 will be: 
1It is apparent that for a parent who cannot afford her child's education having more children 
is preferable to having no child, since her utility explodes to minus infinity if she does not have 
any child (B == 0). 
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log [[ x1 - (g(l) + h)] (1 + r) +owe] + E, 
where E == a log a+ (1 - a) log(l - a). 
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(3.7) 
If she cannot afford to let her child receive education, she will choose to have 
more children, so that her expected income in the middle of Period 2 will be: 
[xt - g(nt)] (1 + r) + ntow, (3.8) 
and her expected utility at the end of Period 2 will be: 
log [ (x1 - g(n1)] (1 + r) + n10W] + E. (3.9) 
Maximising Equation (3.9) with respect to nt gives the optimal number of chil-
dren (n) 2 : 
( ow) n - nt == (gi)-l l + f · (3.10) 
We assume that n ( o, w, r) > 1. 
Since the situation in which individuals prefer not to invest in their child's edu-
cation is the least interesting, we confine our analysis to the case where individuals 
prefer to invest in their child's education if they can afford it, i.e., we assume that 
the following relationship holds: 
Ow(0 - n) > (1 + r) [(g(l) + h) - g(n)]. (3.11) 
This relationship can be easily derived by comparing utilities of a parent who 
has invested to her child's education and of a parent who has not. Note it also 
implies that 0 > n holds. 
2We omit integer restrictions on the number of children throughout. 
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There will be two types of individuals in this economy. On one hand, there will 
be individuals whose disposable income is greater than or equal to g(l) + h and 
they bequeath: 
Bt = (l - a) [ [x1 - (g(l) + h)] (1 + f) + 5w0]. (3.12) 
On the other hand, individuals whose disposable income is less than g(l) + h 
bequeath: 
Bf= (1 - a) [[x 1 - g(n)](l + f) + n5W]. (3.13) 
In this economy, the working status of children (born in Period t) and bequest 
they receive are dependent upon the amount of disposable income their parents 
(born in Period t - 1) have. Therefore, distribution of disposable income in Period 
t - 1 is very important in determining the number of skilled and unskilled workers 
in Period t. We denote the distribution of disposable income for people who were 
born in Period t - 1 by Dt-l and the population by Nt-l · Then it follows: 
100 dD1-1(X1-1) = Nt-l· (3.14) 
This distribution determines the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers in 
Period t that are respectively: 
Nt ~ j 00 dDt-1(Xt-1) ~ Nt-1, 
g(l)+h 
r g(l)+h 
N: ~ n Jo dDt-1 ( Xt-i) ~ nN-:'-1, 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
where N/_ 1 and N-;"_ 1 are the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers in Period 
t - 1, respectively. 
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3.3 The dynamics of disposable income distribu-
tion 
Now we turn to analyse the dynamics of the model. The distribution of disposable 
income in the next period (xt+i) is written as follows: 
Xt+l -
(l-a) [ [ Xt - g( n) ]( 1 + f) + nOW] + ( 1 - O)W if Xt < g(l) + h 
(1 - a) [ [ Xt - (g(l) + h)] (1 + f) + OWB] + (1 - O)wB if g(l) + h < Xt, 
(3.17) 
Figure 3.1 describes the situation. The curves in Figure 3.1 describe the dynamic 
relationship between disposable income of two consecutive periods for two types of 
individuals. 
On one hand, individuals whose disposable income is greater than or equal to 
g(l) + h invest in their child's education so that they work as skilled workers. Their 
descendants in every future generation will do so as well, so that their disposable 
income converges to the long run level Xs: 
Xs == 
(1 - a)ow0 + (1 - o)w0 - (1 - a)(l + r)(g(l) + h) 
1 - (1 - a)(l + r) (3.18) 
On the other hand, individuals whose disposable income is less than g(l) + h do 
not invest in education and have n unskilled children. Their descendants in the all 
future generations will do so as well, and therefore in the long run their disposable 
income converges to xu: 
Xu== 
(1 - a)own + (1 - o)wn - (1 - a)(l + r)g(n) 
n-(1-a)(l +r) (3.19) 
Therefore, in the long run, individuals in this economy will be divided into two 
groups of individuals: skilled workers whose disposable income is Xs and unskilled 
workers whose disposable income is Xu. 
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Xt+ 
-
0 Xu g(l)+h Xs xt 
Figure 3.1: Dynamics of disposable income 
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In order for Points S and U in Figure 3.1 to be locally stable, we assume the 
following relationships between a and f: 
(1 - a)(l + r) < 1. (3.20) 
We can think of the cases where all individuals will be either unskilled or skilled, i.e., 
either of two steady states exists, however neither cases are realistic or interesting. 
The following inequality assures that two steady state equilibria exist: 
(1 - a)5w + (1 _ 5)w + (l - a)(l + r) [g(l) + h - g(n)] 
n <g(l)+h (3.21) 
< (1 - a)5w0 + (1 - 5)w0. 
For the similar reason we also assume that g(l) + h lies between Xu and X5 • 
Note that even in the long run, the relative sizes of two types of individuals 
are changing, since an unskilled parent has n > 1 children whilst a skilled parent 
has only one child. Formally, if we denote the relative size of unskilled workers in 
Period t by lf: 
Nr lu - --- ' 
t == Nf + Nt (3.22) 
where Nr and Nt are the numbers of unskilled and skilled workers in Period t, 
respectively. It follows that the relative size of unskilled workers in Period t + l 
( lf+1 ) will be: 
nN: 
l~+l == Nu + Ns 
n t t 
nlu t 
1 + (n - l)lf. (3.23) 
Throughout the rest of this chapter, we use lf as the measure of inequality in 
Period t, i.e., the larger lf is, the more unequal the society is3 . 
3This definition of inequality is used both in Galor and Zeira (1993) and Galor and Zang (1997), 
which turns out to be problematic. Discussion is provided in the last section of this chapter. 
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Let us denote the average disposable income of working individuals by xy. Then 
the steady state level of the average disposable income of working individuals, x, 
is written as follows: 
X == lim X-T == Xs - lim lT[xs - X-u]-
T-too T-+oo 
(3.24) 
From Equation (3.22), we know that lim lT == l, hence: 
T-too 
X == Xu. (3.25) 
This is just showing that, in the long run, the economy will be dominated by 
the unskilled workers. This result is not surprising because whilst the number 
of skilled workers remains constant throughout, the number of unskilled workers 
increases over time. Unless there is no unskilled individual in the beginning, this 
long run result will be the same for all initial distribution of income. Therefore, 
in order to derive a more meaningful result, we will look at a relationship between 
initial distribution of income and growth in transition. 
3.4 Growth in transition 
In order to calculate the growth rate of disposable income per capita between two 
consecutive periods, let us begin with denoting aggregate disposable income and 
average disposable income ( amongst working people) in Period t + l by Xt+i and 
Xt+i, respectively. Then it follows: 
xt+I = Xt+INt+I = n 1P X~+IdDt(Xt) + 100 xI+1dDt(Xt), (3.26) 
where p = g(l) + h. Substituting Equation (3.17) into Equation (3.26) gives: 
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fP[(l-a)[ _ -] -] Xt+1 ==Xt+1Nt+1 == n Jo n [xt - g(n )] (1 + r) + n5w + (l - 5)w dDt(xt) 
+ [" [(1 - a) [ [ Xt - (g(l) + h)] (1 + r) +owe] (1 - O)W0] dDt(Xt)-
(3.27) 
After tedious calculation, we obtain an alternative representation of Equation 
(3.27): 
Xt+i = [(1 - a) [owe- (g(l) + h)(l + r)] + (1- O)w0] Nt 
+ [(1 - a) [now -Ow0 + (g(l) + h - g(n))(l + r)] + (l - O)W(n - 0)] l~Nt 
+ (1 - a)(l + r)xtNt. 
Dividing Equation (3.28) by Nt+i gives Xt+i in terms of Xt: 
where, 
Nt uNt _ Nt 
Xt+1 == A ~r + Elt N + (l - a)(l + r)xtN 
t+l t+l t+l 
== Nt [A+El~+(l-a)(l+r)xt], 
Nt+l 
A= (l - a) [owe - (g(l) + h)(l + r)] + (1 - O)W0, 
(3.28) 
(3.29) 
E = (l - a) [now - Ow0 + (g(l) + h - g(n))(l + r)] + (1 - O)W(n - 0). 
In the meantime, the ratio of Nt to Nt+i can be easily calculated as follows: 
Nt 
Nt+l 
Nt 
nNu + N 5 t t 
1 
(n - l)lf + l. 
Nt 
nlf Nt + (l - l~)Nt (3.30) 
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Substituting Equation (3.30) into Equation (3.29) and dividing both sides by Xt 
yields the following: 
Xt+l == 1 [ A Elf 
x, (n-l)Zr+1 x,+~+(1-a)(l+r)] . (3.31) 
Now what we want is the growth rate of disposable income per capita between 
Period t and Period t + l ( 1't)- Let us denote disposable income per capita in Period 
t by qt. Then it follows: 
XtNt == qt(Nt + Nt+1). (3.32) 
Hence we can write qt in terms of Xt as follows: 
Xt 
qt == 2 + ( n - l) lf (3.33) 
Using this equation the rate of growth of disposable income per capita can be 
written in terms of Xt and Xt+i: 
qt+1 Xt+1 2 + (n - l)lf 
1't == -- - 1 == -- u - l. 
qt Xt 2 + ( n - l )lt+i (3.34) 
Substituting Equation (3.23) into this equation gives the following: 
Xt+i [ 2 + ( n - l )lf] [ ( n - l )lf + 1] 
1't == ---------- - 1 
Xt 2 + ( n + 2) ( n - l) lf · (3.35) 
Finally substituting Equation (3.31) into this equation yields the following equa-
tion: 
[ 
A Elf _ ] 2 + ( n - l) lf 
1't == - + - + (1 - a)(l + r) ( )( )l1· - 1. 
Xt Xt 2 + n + 2 n - l t 
(3.36) 
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As we will formally state in the proof of Proposition 1 shortly, the growth rate of 
disposable income per capita in Period t ( ,t) is negatively related to the proportion 
of unskilled workers in that period ( lf). Hence, given the evolution of population 
in this economy, the growth rate of disposable income per capita is also negatively 
related to the initial proportion of unskilled workers (l~)- We can, thus, observe 
two different countries achieving different growth rates of disposable income per 
capita due to the difference in initial inequality in disposable income. 
Let us summarise the effect of income distribution upon the growth rate of 
disposable income per capita in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. Consider countries that are identical except for the initial distri-
bution of income. The more unequally income is distributed, the lower the growth 
rate of income per capita will be. 
Proof. First, let us use the following notations for simplicity: 
A Elu 
c(l~) == - + _t + (1 - a)(l + r), 
Xt Xt 
d(l~) == 2_ + (n - l)lf 
Calculating the first derivative of Equation (3.36) with respect to lf yields the 
following: 
a,t 
alr 
8c(lf)d(lu) 8d(lf) (lu) 
8lu t + 8lu C t . 
t t 
We show this is negative. To this end, let us show the signs of 
8
~\~l, d(lf) and 
t 
8d(lf) and c(lf) in turn. 
' t 
First: 
8c(lf) == E < 0, 
Blf Xt 
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since Xt > 0, and it follows from Equation (3.12) and n > l that E > 0. 
Second, it is apparent that d( lf) > 0 since n > l and 0 < lf < l. 
Third, since n > l: 
Finally: 
8d(lf) 
azy 
2(n2 - 1) 
-------2 < 0. 
[ 2 + ( n + 2) ( n - l) lf] 
c(l~) == A+ Elf+ (1 - a)(l + r)xt. 
Xt 
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It is apparent that the denominator is positive, so we check the sign of the numerator 
by which we denote v: 
v =(1 - a)(l - zn [iw(B - n) - (1 + f) [ (g(l) + h) - g(n)]] + (1 - 6)WB(l - zr) 
+ (1 - 6)wnzr + (1 - a) [ [xt - g(n)] (1 + f) + n6w]. 
The second and third terms are obviously positive, and the first and fourth terms 
are positive as well, from Equation (3.8) and Equation (3.12), respectively. We 
have shown that c(lf) > 0. 
Hence: 
8,t == 8c(lf) d(lu) + 8d(lf) c(l~) < 0. 
azy azr t azy 
Using the Chain Rule: 
a,t a,t az: 
azu == azu azu. 
0 t 0 
We know that the second term of the RHS of this equation is positive and we have 
already shown that the first term of the RHS of this equation is negative. Hence 
we have obtained the result we want: 
a,t < o. 
az~ 
• 
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3.5 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we have examined a model in which initial inequality plays an 
important role affecting the growth rate of income per capita in transition, through 
investment in human capital and fertility. This study shows that growth is affected 
by initial income distribution, and that different countries with the same technology 
could grow at different rates. More specifically, we have found that inequality 
hinders growth in transition, since in a more unequal country, less people invest in 
human capital and also population growth is higher. 
However, the model we have explored has several problems. One of them is that 
too many rules are imposed upon the model. The model has only two optimisation 
problems - one by every individual when one choose how much to consume and 
bequeath, and the other by unskilled workers when they choose the number of 
children. The other decisions are given by the rules, such as, individuals always 
investment in human capital when it is feasible; the cost of having a second educated 
child is prohibitively high, etc. 
Aside from this, this model has two major problems. One is that the model 
consistently generates negative long run growth of output per capita. This arises 
because of the new feature of this model, endogenous fertility. In our model, not 
only do individuals choose whether they educate their children but they also choose 
how many children they have. Due to this, the evolutions of population for two 
types of individuals are different. Whilst the number of high productivity people 
remains constant, the number of low productivity people increases at n > l. 4 
Therefore, in the long run, as low productivity people will completely dominate the 
economy, it is destined to exhibit negative growth. 5 This unrealistic feature of the 
model has to be overcome. 
4In models by Galor and Zeira (1993) and Galor and Zang (1997), this asymmetry in population 
growth is not present, so the problem of negative growth has not occurred. 
5Unless initially there is no unskilled worker in the economy, in which case, economy will 
exhibit zero growth in the long run. 
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The other major problem is the definition of inequality. In this paper, we define 
inequality as the proportion of unskilled workers to the whole population. This 
is problematic since there are obvious discrepancies between this definition and 
the "ordinary" inequality definitions. For example, in the long run, the economy 
is described as completely unequal using this definition because it is dominated 
by unskilled workers, but it is described as completely equal using some other 
"ordinary" inequality definitions because those unskilled workers who dominate the 
economy are identical in terms of their disposable income. The use of an "ordinary" 
measure of inequality is required. These problems will be overcome by the model 
we construct in the next chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Education, fertility, and growth: 
Does inequality matter? 
4.1 Introduction 
The model we explore in this chapter not only deals simultaneously with inequality, 
investment in human capital, fertility, and growth, but it also overcomes two major 
problems raised in the previous chapter. At the same time, we deal with more 
complicated optimisation problems than that in the previous chapter, hence less 
rules are imposed upon the model. 
We begin with the overlapping generations model (OLG) of Ehrlich and Lui 
(1991) (hereafter E&L). In their model, a parent decides to have children in order 
to obtain both "companionship" and income support in their old-age. The amount 
of old-age support depends upon how much education they decide to provide as 
well as how many children they decide to have. Their prominent message is that 
an economy could either stagnate, having large numbers of children who are less 
educated, or approach the balanced growth path induced by the accumulation of 
human capital, where the number of children per family is driven down to its 
minimum level. Accordingly, they claim that changes in economic factors such as 
better health care that increases probability of survival could be important for an 
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economy as a whole to start going through the demographic transition. 
We give a different interpretation to their model. Instead of looking at an 
economy as a whole, we look at a number of heterogeneous individuals within an 
economy. First, we focus upon the evolution of these heterogeneous individuals 
and their descendants ( dynasties henceforth). The model predicts that individual 
output for some dynasties could grow but for others it could stagnate. Then we 
sum up the dynasties and focus upon an economy as a whole. This will enable us 
to see if different initial distributions of human capital have different implications 
for the evolution of the economy. 
One of the distinguishing features of the model in this chapter is that the econ-
omy could exhibit endogenous growth. No previous attempt has been made to 
analyse the inequality effect upon growth via human capital and fertility within 
the endogenous growth model framework, where long run positive growth is ob-
served. 
Unlike the model in the previous chapter that consistently generates negative 
growth, various types of (long run) dynamics could be considered according to the 
different values of parameters. We will focus upon two particular types of economies 
- one that has experienced the productivity take-off, and the other that has not. 
The latter type of economy is characterised by zero per-capita growth in the long 
run, whereas the former can exhibit positive long run per-capita growth. In the 
sense that this model can generate various long run growth dynamics, one of the 
drawbacks from the previous chapter, that the model consistently generates neg-
ative long run growth, has been overcome. We will also show that two types of 
economies, before and after the productivity take-off, have different implications 
for demographic dynamics - the productivity take-off is a prerequisite to the de-
mographic transition for an economy. 
We attempt to overcome the other problem raised in the previous chapter -
the definition of inequality. To this end, we assume that the initial distribution 
of human capital is lognormal and use the coefficient of variation as a measure 
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of inequality. We study the relationship between initial inequality and subsequent 
growth conducting numerical simulations based upon two dynamic systems and the 
initial lognormal distribution of human capital. Considering a few economies that 
are identical but for the variance of initial human capital, we will compare how 
these economies evolve over time. In contrast to the existing empirical literature, 
the model predicts that inequality might have different implications for growth 
depending upon an economy's demographic stage of development. That is, the the 
effect of inequality upon growth is predicted to be non-monotonic. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the model. 
The dynamics of the economy, given a set of parameters, is examined numerically 
in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 discusses how different economies will evolve accord-
ing to different initial distributions of human capital, and conjectures the impact 
of initial distribution on subsequent growth. Simulations are conducted in Sec-
tion 4.5 in order to illustrate these conjectures. Concluding remarks are provided 
in Section 4.6. 
4.2 The model 
We consider a two-sector endogenous growth model without physical capital. Het-
erogeneous individuals live for three periods in overlapping generations. An in-
dividual is born as a child, becomes a young parent, and becomes an old parent 
before she dies. 1 
Let us consider an individual of dynasty i who is born in Period t - 1. When 
she is a child, she is dependent upon her parent and receives education from her 
parent. Let us denote the level of human capital she receives from her parent by Hf. 
Every individual is assumed to be endowed with the basic level of human capital 
fl. (Hi+ fl) will, therefore, be the level of human capital she possesses when she 
1 Some individuals will not survive for three periods, i.e., some people may die in Period One 
or Two. 
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becomes a young parent at Period t. A child will survive to become a young parent 
with probability 1r1 that is assumed to be constant over time and identical across 
individuals. 
When she is a young parent, she is no longer dependent upon her parent and 
can produce a perishable consumption good Qt, subject to the following production 
function: 
Q~ == ( H; + H)l~, ( 4.1) 
where Zi denotes the time that is spent to produce this good. She produces this 
good since she gets utility from cons.urning it when she is a young parent , but she 
also takes her future consumption into account in making her production decision. 
In Period t + l she will survive to become an old parent , but again with probability 
1r2 that is assumed to be constant over time and across individuals. She will be 
dependent upon her children at this stage of life. 2 That is , she is no longer able to 
produce anything, but instead she can expect support from her children (if there 
are any). The amount of support depends upon both how much she has invested in 
her children's education and how many of her children survive to become a young 
parent. We will come back to this issue shortly. 
A young parent has T units of time. It is assumed that child rearing costs v 
units of time per child. Hence, she faces the following time constraint: 
. . 
l i T 2 h1 1 t == - vnt - t nt, (4.2) 
2Not only are individuals unable to store a consumption good, but also they are assumed 
to have no access to credit markets. Therefore, in this model, children are treated as if they 
were financial assets. This treatment of children may be problematic especially when industrial 
countries are concerned, where most of people can use credit markets. However, it may be more 
realistic as far as developing countries are the focus, where not many people have access to 
credit markets. The assumption of imperfect credit markets is commonly imposed in the existing 
literature when developing countries are concerned. 
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where h~ is the time she devotes to educating each child and n~ is the number of 
children. 
A young parent may have an incentive to invest in education of her children as 
she can expect more support from them in the future. We assume that there is 
a custom that people will follow, in which a young parent gives her ( old) parent 
an amount of the consumption good equivalent to a certain ratio w of the educa-
tion that she received,3 i.e., the level of human capital Ht+1 . 4 Let us assume the 
following human capital production function: 
H;+1 == A(H; + H)h~, (4.3) 
where A is a positive productivity parameter and Hf+i is the level of human capital 
that a child receives from her (young) parent. 
Aside from material support, an old parent may find "companionship" by her 
children worthwhile. In order to specify this "companionship" function, we need 
the number of expected children. The number of surviving children is subject 
to a binomial distribution, where nt is the number of trials (children) and 1r1 is 
the probability of success (survival). Therefore, the expected number of surviving 
children is 1r1nt. The "companionship" function is specified as follows: 
M;+1 == ( 1r1 n; )-Y, (4.4) 
3If w is determined endogenously in the model, we get a system of nonlinear difference equa-
tions. Since the objective of this thesis is not uncovering the inter-generational transfer mecha-
nism, the assumption of the constant compensation rate w should not be important. 
4This compensation scheme is the same as in E&L. It makes sense since children compensate 
their parent in strict proportion to the latter's contribution to their productive capacity. The al-
ternative scheme, which is more egalitarian, is to make children support their parent in proportion 
to the farmer's total human capital, i.e., children give their parent w(Ht+l + fl). However, this 
difference is not essential. E&L impose this assumption as well except in their simplest model. 
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where, E (0, 1]. This equation shows that "companionship" by children is subject 
to diminishing returns to the expected number of children unless , == 1. Given the 
expected number of surviving children, we can obtain the expected support that 
the surviving old parent can get and the expected support that the surviving young 
parent has to give, which are 1r1ntWHt+1 and 1r2wHt, respectively. 
Each individual gets utility from consumption when she is a young parent, and 
from consumption and "companionship" by her children when she is an old parent. 
Specifically, we assume the following CIES ( constant intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution) utility function: 
i -Ut-
( ) 
1-8 
1,t + 61r2 ~ " + ( Ci ) 1-8 - 1 [ ctt+ 1 
- 1 ( M!+1) i-e -1] 
l - 0 ' 
( 4.5) 
where 0 > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and ci and 
c~ are consumption when she is a young parent and an old parent, respectively. 5 The 
utility of consumption when she is old is discounted for the associated probability 
of survival 1r2 and the rate of time preference p, with 6 1/(1 + p). 
There may be a case where all children die, in which case, their parent will not 
get any support or "companionship" when she becomes an old parent. This will be a 
problem because having neither support nor "companionship" would imply that the 
change in her marginal utility is -oo, given the CIES utility function as in Equation 
( 4.5). Since a young parent is aware of this possibility, she will try to increase the 
number of children to oo in order to avoid this worst scenario. But since this is 
impossible from Equation ( 4.2), i.e., since having children incurs costs, the model 
becomes unsolvable. There are several ways to overcome this problem, but we follow 
the method as in E&L.6 We assume that dynasty i is the representative of a number 
5
-0 is the elasticity of marginal utility, which is assumed to be constant. The higher 0, the 
more rapid is the proportionate decline in u' ( c) in response to increase in c and, hence, the less 
willing individuals are to accept deviations from a uniform pattern of consumption over time. As 
0 approaches 0, individuals are indifferent to the timing of consumption as long as c51r2 == 1. 
6The alternative way is just to let an old parent work so that she can surely consume when she 
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of identical dynasties with independent prospects of survival. The expected old-age 
support could be treated as certain, if the old-age insurance arrangement applied 
to this extended dynasty. Under this arrangement, all related people within the 
extended dynasty share in the actual responsibilities and benefits associated with 
old-age support and "companionship" through mutual assistance. Let us postulate 
that the insurance pool is large enough and administrative costs are negligible so 
that each intergenerational contract would be honoured on an actuarially fair basis. 
Then, the actual consumption flows of the representative surviving young parent 
and old parent can be written as follows, respectively: 
ctt == (H; + H)(T - vn~ - h~n~) - 1r2wH;, 
. . . 
i i Hi 
c2,t+1 == 1r1ntw t+1, 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
and the actual "companionship" received by an old parent can be written as in 
Equation ( 4.4). 
Now let us analyse optimal decisions by the representative of dynasty i. Given 
Ht, a young parent of dynasty i in Period t chooses the optimal values of n~ > 0 and 
h~ > 0 in order to maximise her expected utility function ( 4.5) subject to Equations 
(4.4), (4.6), and (4.7). The first order conditions are as follows: 
i e hi [ Mi i -e] C2,t+l t t+l _ t 
( i ) > o 1r 2 ( A 1r 1 w) ( h; ) 1 + / ( ; ) = 07r 2 Rt,n, 
cl,t V + t C2,t+l 
(4.8) 
( c1t+1)
8 
· 
'i > 01r2( A1r1 w) = 01r2R~,h, 
Cl t , 
(4.9) 
where 01r2R~ and 01r2Rt represent discounted expected rates of return on investment 
in quantity and quality of children, respectively. 7 
is an old parent. But this makes mathematics a lot more complicated without giving us further 
insight. 
7If "companionship" were not assumed ( 1 == 0), the rate of return on investment in quality of 
children ( education) would always exceed that on investment in quantity of children, provided that 
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From these equations we can obtain the following relationship: 
( t )-Y-
. V > ~lnt . 1 ] 1-0 
i > t <==*--, i 
Rt,h < Rt,n h < [ wHt+l ( 4.10) 
The following lemmas can be derived from this equation. 
(E&L) Lemma 1. The return on quantity of children (Rtn) cannot be greater 
than the return on quality of children {R~ h). 
' 
Proof. Suppose the return on quantity of children is greater than the return on 
quality of children. It follows that h will approach zero and Equation ( 4.10) cannot 
hold in the way that the return on quantity of children exceeds the return on quality 
of children. Contradiction. • 
(E&L) Lemma 2. If Hf is sufficiently large and 0 < 1) then the return on quality 
of children {R~ h) exceeds the return on quantity of children {R~ nJ when n has a 
' ' 
positive lower bound.8 
the compensation rate w is positive . This is intuitively apparent as the equi-proportional increases 
in h and n give the same marginal utility benefits, but the marginal utility cost of n is always 
greater than that of h since the former involves the cost of both rearing and educating children 
whilst the latter only involves the cost of educating children. The equi-proportional increases in h 
and n imply dnt == dht. The marginal utility benefit of n and hare c2~+11r1wA(Ht+fI)htdnt and 
nt ht ' 
c2,~+l 1r1 wA(Ht + fl)ntdht, respectively, and they are clearly the same. The marginal utility cost 
of n is C1,~dntht(Ht +fl) +c1,~dntv(Ht +fl) and the marginal utility cost of his c1,~ dhtnt(Ht +fl). 
The latter is the same as the first term of the marginal utility cost of n given the equi-proportional 
increases in h and n. Hence, the marginal utility cost of n is always larger than that of h by 
c1~dntv(Ht + fl). Under such circumstances, a young parent would want the number of children 
' 
to be the smallest possible. Therefore, in order to solve the problem, we need to assume that n 
has a lower bound. Given that n has a lower bound, Equation ( 4.8 ) (with,== 0) will be met with 
strict inequality and Equation ( 4.9) will be met with equality. 
8We will not consider the case where 0 > 1, since this is inconsistent with any economy that 
will be on the balanced growth path. Intuitively, if 0 is high enough, then individuals want to a 
uniform patten of consumption over time, in which case they will not invest as much in human 
capital. 
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Proof. The RHS of Equation ( 4.10) is decreasing in H;, whereas the LHS has a 
lower bound. Hence, the return on quality of children must become higher than 
the return on quantity of children with a sufficiently high level of human capital. D 
Intuition behind this lemma is straightforward. As the level of human capital 
increases, old-age support from children increases, but "companionship" will not be 
affected by an increase in the level of human capital. Hence the return on quantity 
of children will become lower than that on quality of children, and eventually the 
optimal number of children will fall to its minimum level 1. 9 
Let us simplify the model in order not to make mathematics unnecessarily com-
plicated. We assume that , == 1, which implies constant marginal returns to com-
panionship from having children. Given this, since the interior solution implies 
R~ n == R~ h, h~ is determined by the following relationship: 
' ' 
1-8 
h~ == v½ [Aw(H; + H)]-0 • ( 4.11) 
Substituting this into Equation ( 4.3) yields: 
H1+i == w 
1
;
0 [Av(H; + H)] ½. ( 4.12) 
The number of children can be expressed as a function of Hf combining Equa-
tions (4.3), (4.6), (4.7), (4.9), and (4.11): 
, Aw [ ( T - 1r 2 w) Ht + TH] 
nt == 1 , 
Avw(H} + H) + [Avw(Hi + HJ] 8 [1 + Az-1] 
( 4.13) 
[ ] 
1/8 
where Z == 81r2A1rt-0w 1-B . 
9If "companionship" is assumed, n need not have a lower bound because a young parent can 
lower n as much as she wants in order to find an interior solution. Throughout this chapter, 
however, we assume that n has a lower bound as do E&L. 
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As for the corner solution, Equation ( 4.9) holds as an equality but Equation 
( 4.8) holds as a strict inequality, from (E&L) Lemma 2. Therefore, combining 
Equations (4.3), (4.6), (4.7), and (4.9), and given n == l, we can obtain an equation 
for the law of motion for the human capital accumulation for this case: 
where, 
. . 
H;+1 == aH; + b, 
AZ(T - v - 1r2w) 
a== A+Z ' 
b== AZ(T-v)fl_ 
A+Z 
Investment in education can be easily derived as follows: 
i Z [ Ht ] ht == A + z T - V - 7r2W Hi + fl . 
4.3 The dynamics of the economy 
(4.14) 
( 4.15) 
As is standard in the two-sector endogenous growth models with human capital, 
growth in the economy described in this chapter is driven by the accumulation of 
human capital. Therefore, the dynamics of the economy is determined by Equations 
( 4.12) and ( 4.14). 
Various types of dynamics could be considered according to the different values 
of parameters, but let us focus upon two particular types. One is where economies 
decline and stagnate in the long run ( Case I, henceforth) and the other is where 
they exhibit long run positive growth ( Case II, henceforth) .10 
10The former case may sound rather odd but, in fact, it conforms to the stylised fact - more 
than 10 per cent of the countries in the Penn World Table experienced negative growth during 
the period 1960-1989. 
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4.3.1 Case I 
To begin with, we choose the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to be 2, i.e ., 
0 == 0.5. 11 When n > l, the accumulation of human capital will become subject to 
the following quadratic relationship: 
i 2 2 i - 2 Ht+i == wA v (Ht + H ) . (4 .16) 
It is easy to show that the necessary and sufficient conditions for this curve to 
intersect the 45° degree line twice is A2 < 
1 
- . In turn , when Hf is sufficiently 
4v 2wH 
high ( see E&L Lemma 2), n == l and H;+1 is a linear function of Ht as in Equation 
( 4.14), so whether or not a is greater than unity will determine whether this curve 
intersects the 45° degree line at the relevant region . This depends upon values of 
all parameters. 
For Case I, other parameter values are chosen so that two positive fixed points 
exist. 12 Putting Equations (4.14) and (4.16) together, we can draw a bold curve 
(phase line, hereafter) as in Figure 4.1. 
Points B and S in the diagram represent fixed points , and HB and Hs are the 
levels of human capital associated with these points, respectively. 
The evolution of human capital 
If individual i happens to have exactly the same level of human capital as either of 
Hs or HB, she will pass to her children exactly the same amount of human capital 
as she received from her parent. There will be no growth in individual output in 
11 A number of studies have attempted to estimate the magnitude of the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution. Estimates normally lie around or below unity, but vary substantially (see 
Blanchard and Fischer, 1989), and there seems to be no common agreement on this account. As 
in footnote 8, we will only consider the case where 0 < 1 hereafter. 
12The values for the parameters are as follows: A== 7.4, fI == 1, 5 == 0.7 , v == 0.12 , 1r1 == 1r2 == 
0.75, w == 0.26, T == 1. Two fixed points are approximately 2.47 and 0.40. 
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H_t+l 
HS HB H* 
H_t 
Figure 4.1: Evolution of human capital: Case I 
these cases, since there is no accumulation in human capital. Note that Point S is 
stable but Point B is unstable. 
Aside from these two exceptional cases, in the long run, dynasty i can end up 
either being stagnant or growing at a constant rate. Let us examine these cases in 
turn. If individual i in this economy happens to have less human capital than the 
critical level of human capital HB, eventually human capital of her descendants will 
converge to Point S, which is the stable steady state. In contrast, if she happens 
to have more human capital than HB, her descendants will eventually be on the 
linear segment of the phase line. That is, the growth rate of human capital will 
asymptotically approach a constant in the long run. 
Lemma 1. The growth rate of human capital for dynasties that start with a level 
of human capital more than HB will asymptotically approach a positive constant 
from above if a > l. 
Proof. Dividing both sides of Equation ( 4.14) by Hf yields: 
HI+1 b 
--. ==a+-.. Ht Ht 
t t 
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Subtracting 1 from both sides of this equation gives: 
i _ H1+1 - H; b 
g H,t == Hi == a + Hi - l. 
t t 
Note that bis positive (see Equation (4.14)). Taking the limit concludes the proof: 
lim gk t == a - l, 
t-+oo ' 
where a== a(A, o, 1r2 , w, v, a, T) > l. • 
Let us call HB the threshold level of human capital henceforth. 
The evolution of the growth rate of individual output 
Figure 4.2 describes the evolution of the growth rate of individual output. Five 
dynasties, whose initial levels of human capital are 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, are the focus. 13 
If dynasty i starts with a level of human capital below the threshold ( H0 == l 
and H0 == 2 in the figure), individuals who belong to this dynasty will experience 
negative growth 14 and eventually will converge to the steady state where there is no 
growth. This corresponds to the fact that the level of human capital is approaching 
Point S. If dynasty i starts with a level of human capital above the threshold 
( Ho == 3, Ho == 4, and H0 == 5 in the figure), people who belong to this dynasty will 
experience positive growth, since human capital will be accumulated forever. The 
growth rate of individual output will asymptotically approach a constant. 
The evolution of the number of children 
The evolution of the number of children is illustrated in Figure 4.3. If dynasty 
i starts with a level of human capital below the threshold ( H0 == l and Ho == 2 
in the figure), the number of children born for this dynasty will increase until it 
13Here, we are ignoring the case where a dynasty initially has a level of human capital of either 
HB or Hs. It is clear that if this is the case, individuals who belong to this dynasty will experience 
zero growth forever, since there will be no accumulation of human capital. 
14If the dynasty starts below S, it will approach the steady state from below, and hence will 
experience positive growth. However, let us omit this possibility for brevity. 
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converges to a certain number. 15 If dynasty i starts with a level of human capital 
above the threshold ( H0 == 3, H 0 == 4, and H0 == 5 in the figure), the number of 
children for this dynasty will decrease and will approach its minimum level, one, 
in the long run. 16 The interesting observation that is worth emphasising is that 
individuals who possess higher human capital have less children, which conforms 
to the stylised fact. 
The evolutions of education and working time 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate the evolution of investment in human capital and 
the evolution of working time, respectively. These figures show that if dynasty 
15The number of children clearly converges to this level from above if the dynasty starts with 
the level of human capital below H s, and vice versa. 
16If dynasty i starts with the threshold level of human capital, HB or Hs, the number of 
children for this dynasty stays the same forever at the level somewhere between 1 and the number 
of children when a dynasty has approached the steady state. 
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i starts with a level of human capital above the threshold ( H0 == 3, Ho == 4, and 
H0 == 5 in the figure), investment in human capital for this dynasty will increase 
and approach a constant, whilst working time for this dynasty will decrease and 
will also approach a constant. In contrast, if dynasty i starts with a level of human 
capital below the threshold ( H0 == l and H 1 == 2 in the figure), investment in human 
capital for this dynasty will decrease and approach a constant, whilst working time 
for this dynasty will decrease and will also approach a constant. In the long run, 
dynasties that initially possess more human capital than the threshold level will 
invest more in education and work harder. This happens because dynasties that 
initially possess less human capital than the threshold level will decide to have 
many more children. That is, as the number of children increases as described in 
Figure 4.3, both investment in human capital and working time decrease so that 
the time constraint, Equation ( 4.2), holds. 17 
17 One exceptional case is where dynasty i starts with the threshold level of human capital. In 
this case, it is obvious that both investment in human capital and working time will be constant 
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The growth rate of output per capita in the long run 
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Let us now analyse the evolution of the· output per capita growth rate in the long 
run. This depends greatly upon the initial distribution of human capital. If some 
dynasties happen to start below the threshold, the rate of growth per capita be-
comes negative before it converges to zero. This situation is depicted in Figure 
4.6. 
The main reason that accounts for this phenomenon is an increase in population 
over time. In the long run, people who belong to the dynasties that have started 
below the threshold will converge to the steady state, S, where they have a constant 
number of children, which is greater than 1. People who belong to these dynasties 
will keep increasing but their individual output will decline and approach a con-
stant. In contrast, people who belong to the dynasties that have started above the 
threshold will keep accumulating their human capital but start having less children 
throughout. 
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until having only one child. Although output per individual for these dynasties 
will keep growing, because we are assuming a constant probability of survival, the 
number of people who belong to these dynasties will keep decreasing. Hence, the 
former dominates the latter eventually, and this economy will begin to experience 
negative growth. 18 Note that under this growth regime, not only does the econ-
omy exhibit negative growth (before it approaches zero) but its population also 
continues increasing. 
Comparative dynamics: Productivity take-off 
Before proceeding to Case II where every dynasty grows forever, and thus, the 
economy will approach exhibit positive per capita growth in the long run, let us 
analyse what shocks may make the economy move from Case I to Case II. One can 
easily infer that the threshold level of human capital HB will vary according to the 
values of parameters. It is easy to show that, for example, an increase in A or H 
lowers the threshold level of human capital. Intuition behind this is as follows. An 
increase in A implies a technological improvement that leads to greater output in 
the future. An increase in fI means that individuals have greater level of basic 
human capital, which could be induced by improvement in work ethics. These 
permanent shocks make investment in human capital more attractive, hence the 
critical level of human capital will decrease. If these increases are large enough, the 
1 
economy can move to Case II so that A 2 > - will be satisfied. 19 Let us focus 4v 2wH 
upon a sufficiently large increase in A, and regard economies that have enjoyed this 
shock as those that have experienced the productivity take-off. We delve into the 
analysis of this type of economy in the next subsection. 
18In the long run, as dynasties that started above the threshold become negligible, the growth 
rate of output per capita will converge to zero. 
19E&L focus particularly upon an increase 1r1 that can make the economy move from Case 
I to Case II. In this chapter, this is not the case because , = 1 is assumed for mathematical 
convenience. If it were not assumed, an increase in 1r1 would also be one of the candidates that 
make the economy move to Case II. 
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Figure 4. 7: Evolution of human capital: Case II 
4.3.2 Case II 
Let us assume that the productivity take-off has taken place, i.e., A2 > 2 H 4v w 
1 
and a> 1.20 Now, the economy is described graphically as in Figure 4.7. 
The evolution of human capital 
There are no fixed points of human capital in this economy. It is apparent that all 
dynasties, regardless of the initial level of human capital, will accumulate human 
capital and the growth rate of human capital will asymptotically approach a positive 
constant in the long run (see Lemma 1). 
The evolution of the growth rate of individual output 
All dynasties will experience positive growth, since human capital will be accumu-
lated. In the long run, the growth rate of individual output will asymptotically 
approach a constant. 
20The values for the parameters are as follows: A== 7.5, fI = 1.5, 5 == 0.7, v = 0.16, -rr1 == -rr2 == 1, 
w == 0.18, T == 1. 
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The evolutions of the other variables 
Corresponding to the fact that all dynasties accumulate human capital, the number 
of children will decrease and will hit its minimum level, one, in the long run. It 
is important here to note here, in relation to the demographic transition we will 
discuss shortly, that the growth rate of population will decline and become zero. 
It is also apparent that investment in human capital for all dynasties will increase 
and approach a constant, whilst working time will decrease and will also approach 
a constant. 
The growth rate of output per capita in the long run 
From Lemma 1 and Equation (4.1), we can induce that the growth rate of output 
per capita in the long run will approach a constant given 1r1 == 1r2 == 1.21 
Remark 1. Regardless of initial distribution of human capital1 in Case II, the 
growth rate of output per capita will asymptotically approach a constant given 1r1 == 
11"2 == 1. 
Proof. Given 1r1 == 1r2 == 1, we know that population will become constant in the 
long run in Case II, so it is sufficient if we show that the growth rate of aggregate 
output will asymptotically approach a constant. Moreover, in the long run, the 
number of workers will become constant, so it is sufficient if we show that the 
growth rate of individual output will asymptotically approach a constant. 
The growth rate of individual output, 9~,t, can be calculated using Equa-
tion (4.1). 
- 1 == -_ . 
H;+1 H 
Ht + Hf 1:+1 _ 1. 
Hi H zi t t 
-+-Hi Hi 
t t 
21If 7r1 < 1, then population will decline in the long run. In this case, the growth rate of output 
per capita will increase at a constant rate in the long run. 
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Bearing in mind that l~ will approach a constant in the long run, we can conclude 
the proof by taking the limit: 
Hi 
1. i 1· t+l 1 1 Im 9Q t == Im . - == a - , 
t• oo ' t• oo Hi t 
where the last equality comes from Lemma 1. • 
4.3.3 Demographic transition 
The dynamics we have seen have relevance to the demographic transition. We have 
seen that in an economy in Case II, the growth rate of population declines before 
it becomes zero. In contrast, in Case I, population will continue increasing. This is 
due to the fact that individuals optimise the number of children given their level of 
human capital. Let us use Figures 4.1 and 4. 7 in order to explain the difference in 
demographic dynamics between these two cases - before and after the productivity 
take-off. 
Let us suppose that dynasties are distributed both above and below the thresh-
old in an economy before the productivity take-off (Figure 4.1). Individuals who 
belong to dynasties below the threshold will keep having many children, whilst 
those who belong to dynasties above the threshold will eventually have only one 
child. We have seen that this economy will be dominated by the former dynasties, 
so it exhibits negative growth and population increases . 
However, if a sufficiently large productivity shock hits this economy, the phase 
line will be pulled up and every individual now starts accumulating human capital 
and having less children (Figure 4. 7). Eventually, every individual's level of human 
capital will become greater than H*. At this stage, this economy has completed 
the demographic transition, i.e., every individual in this economy has one child. 
The productivity take-off is a prerequisite for the economy to begin the demo-
graphic transition. 22 
22 Note that this model is not explaining all aspects of what demographers call the demographic 
transition, which has to do with both the birth and death rates. 
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4.4 Inequality: Does it matter? 
Now, we can see the importance in this model of the level of initial human capital. 
It determines how each dynasty evolves over time, and hence, how output per capita 
evolves over time. Let us consider an economy in which we have a distribution of 
heterogeneous individuals (dynasties) with different levels of human capital. From 
the analysis in the last section, one can see that individuals and their descendants 
will accumulate human capital in different manners, according to human capital 
they possess. Therefore, the growth rate of output per worker is likely to be affected 
by initial distribution of human capital. 23 
Also, it is very important to note that the evolution of an economy depends 
greatly upon its demographic stage of development. If we consider an economy with 
certain distribution of human capital, the way it evolves depends upon whether or 
not it has begun the demographic transition. Therefore, we will investigate how 
initial distribution affects the evolution of the economy case by case. Before that 
we define inequality. 
In the studies by Galor and Zeira (1993), Perotti (1996), and Galor and Zang 
(1997), which are similar to this study, an economy is regarded as more unequal if 
a greater proportion of people have a level of human capital below the critical level 
HB. It is quite clear that this definition of inequality is problematic. 24 Instead of 
23Note that human capital and output are positively related in the model. We can see this 
relationship, firstly, in Equation ( 4.1), which shows that greater H implies greater Q, given l is 
constant. Secondly, the analysis in this section, especially Figure 4.5, implies that the greater H, 
the longer people work. Therefore, human capital distribution and income distribution virtually 
have the same qualitative implication. 
24The following simple example illustrates the problem. Compare the following two economies, 
one in which everyone has the same level of human capital below HB, and the other in which 
everyone has the same level of human capital above HB. The former economy is less equal whereas 
the latter one is more equal by this definition. However, both economies should be completely 
equal if we use a standard measure of inequality such as the coefficient of variation or the Gini 
coefficient. 
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using this problematic definition, we shall adopt the coefficient of variation as the 
measure of inequality. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided 
by the mean, so only relative incomes matter. 
4.4.1 Before the productivity take-off 
Let us consider very poor economies that have not begun t he demographic tran-
sition. As we have looked at in the previous section, these economies will decline 
and stagnate in the long run. This will be true for any initial distribution except 
for the one where every dynasty starts above the threshold , which is unlikely to be 
observed in extremely poor economies. We summarise it as follows: 
Remark 2. If the economy has not begun the demographic transition1 and if at 
least one dynasty starts below the threshold1 the economy will stagnate in the long 
run1 regardless of initial distribution. 
Proof. Suppose that dynasties are indexed from 1 to N according to the initial 
level of human capital, and that dynasties from 1 to I have levels of human capital 
below HB. Let us denote the growth rate of output per worker and the number of 
workers for dynasty i in Period t by rt and w~, respectively. Then: 
N · · N · 
_ l Li=l w;+1 Q~+1 l Li=l w;+1 rt == n N . . - n N . 
Li=l w; Q~ Li=l w; 
I · · N · · 
== ln [I:i=l WJ+1 Q;+1 + I:;1+1 w;+i Q;+1] 
Li=l w;Q~ + Li=I+1 w;Q~ 
I · N · 
_ 1 [ I:i=l w;+1 + Li=I+1 w:+1] n I · N · . 
Li=l w; + Li=I+1 w; 
( 4 .17) 
N i i N ii N i N i 
When t -+ 00 , Li=I+1 wt+1 Qt+1, Li=I+1 wt Qt, Li=I+1 wt+1, and Li=I+1 wt all ap-
proach zero. This implies that the second term of the right hand side of Equa-
tion ( 4.17) approaches ln ns . Also, for all i from 1 to I: 
lim Q! == (Hs + fl)ls, 
t-too 
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where ls is working time in the steady state S. This implies that the first term of 
the right hand side of Equation ( 4.17) approaches ln ns when t • oo. Therefore: 
lim rt == ln ns - ln ns == 0. 
t• oo 
• 
Since this long run story is uninteresting, we shall look at what happens in the 
short run. 25 Let us consider two very poor countries , in terms of human capital, 
where almost all dynasties decline towards the steady state. For brevity, we shall 
call the more unequal country, Country I, and the other one Country E. How 
different will the evolution of these two economies be in the short run? 
Let us introduce Figure 4.8 in order to conjecture how Country I will evolve 
compared to Country E. The bold probability density function in the figure shows 
initial human capital distribution of Country I. There are two important differences 
in distributions that lead to different evolutions of economies. First, initially in 
Country I, there are more extremely-poor dynasties that choose to have a relatively 
large number of children (shaded area A in Figure 4.8) . They will contribute to 
lower both output per capita and output per worker more than in Country E . Let 
me call this difference in distributions the difference in extreme-poor for brevity. 
Second, initially in Country I, there are more super-rich dynasties that produce 
much more output than others do (shaded area B in Figure 4.8). These dynasties 
choose to have a relatively small number of children ( one child after their human 
capital hits a certain level), and will contribute to raise both output per capita 
and output per worker more than in Country E. We shall call this difference in 
distributions the difference in super-rich henceforth. 
These two differences have critically important effects in determining the dif-
ference in the growth rate of output per worker, but it is easy to see that both 
differences are diminishing over time. The difference in super-rich will disappear in 
25 Note that one period in this model is a generation, which is 25 years . 
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Figure 4.8: Extreme-poor and super-rich 
due course because the population of super-rich dynasties diminish over time, given 
that probability of survival is less than one. In contrast , the difference in extreme-
poor will be diminishing over time since every dynasty below the critical threshold 
will eventually have the same number of children and output at the steady state. 2
6 
The difference in the growth rates of output per worker between two countries 
will largely depend upon these differences in distributions. However , it is ambiguous 
which one of these differences will influence the growth rate more in the short run. 
For example, if the difference in extreme-poor is huge but the difference in super-
rich is negligible, then the growth rate will be much higher in Country E than 
in Country I. But if the difference in super-rich diminishes much slower than the 
difference in extreme-poor does, then the growth rate in Country I may become 
higher than in Country E, because whilst most of declining dynasties are already 
around the steady state, i.e., the population growth rates are the same for the 
both countries, there still exists the difference in distributions in super-rich. These 
26 As we have seen in Remark 2, in the long run where both of these effects are zero, both 
economies will grow at the same rate, which is zero. 
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things will depend upon what type of distribution we assume in the first place as 
well as the parameter values. 
4.4.2 After the productivity take-off 
Now we consider economies that have already begun the demographic transition. 
As for these economies, we already know that the growth rate of output per worker 
will approach a constant in the long run for any initial distribution. We summarise 
it as follows: 
Remark 3. The growth rate of output per worker will asymptotically approach a 
constant in the long run for Case II given 1r1 == 1r2 == 1. 
Proof. From Remark 1, we know that the growth rate of output per capita will 
asymptotically approach a constant in the long run. We also know that, in the 
long run, the number of workers will become a third of population. Therefore, the 
growth rates of output per worker and output per capita will approaches the same 
positive constant. • 
How does the growth rate of output per worker evolve in the short run? We will 
look at two types of economies. One is middle-income economies where the mean 
of initial human capital is still low, and the other is advanced economies where the 
mean of initial human capital is high. The definitions of Country I and Country 
E are the same as they are in the previous subsection. We define differences in 
distributions of poor and rich as shaded areas C and D , respectively, in Figure 4.9 . 
The short run dynamics: Middle-income economies 
The growth rate of output per-worker must be positive in the short run. It should 
be fair to guess that Country E will grow faster than Country I for the following 
reason. Given that both Country I and Country E are still in their development 
stage, the difference in aggregate output due to the difference in rich is still not that 
large, but the difference in population growth rates is large due to the difference in 
Education, fertility, and growth 90 
Frequency 
D 
HO 
Figure 4.9: Poor and rich 
poor. The population growth rate will be significantly higher in Country I than in 
Country E due to that difference, and since the difference in rich is not large enough 
to offset it, i.e., the growth rate of the output is not large enough in Country I, the 
growth rate of output per worker will be higher in Country E. 
Regarding middle-income economies, for the first few generations, the growth 
rate of output per worker should be increasing. However, as every dynasty is about 
to reach the point where n == 1, it could become decreasing. This happens because 
of the following . By that stage, almost all the dynasties are on the linear segment 
of the phase line and they are approaching to grow at a constant rate ( from above: 
see Lemma 1). Only a small proportion of the whole dynasties haven> 1 but their 
output grows faster. When this proportion of dynasties reaches the linear segment 
of the phase line, they haven == 1 ( the worker growth rate will decrease) and output 
grows a little slower than before. 27 Therefore, if a decrease in the population growth 
rate is relatively small compared with a decrease in the growth rate of aggregate 
27This story depends upon parameter values. More specifically, we need to assume that the 
derivative of Equation 4.16 with respect to Ht evaluated at H* is greater than a. 
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output, then the growth rate of output per worker should become lower. 
The short run dynamics: Advanced economies 
The story goes similarly for advanced economies. We should again expect that 
Country E grows faster than Country I in the short run but for a different reason. 
Recall that most of the dynasties are already on the linear segment of the phase 
line, and the size of the economy is reasonably big. In this case, we can expect that 
the difference in rich does not matter so much to per-worker output. However, 
the difference in poor will certainly matter. Country I has the higher population 
growth rate, and this will push down the growth rate of output per worker. 
In passing, since most of the dynasties are on the linear segment of the phase 
line already, the growth rate of output per worker could be decreasing throughout 
as we have just seen before. 
In the next section, we will conduct simulations in order to see how economies 
will evolve given different initial human capital distributions. 
4.5 Simulations: Inequality matters 
Let us assume that initial human capital is lognormally distributed, that is, log-
arithm of initial human capital is normally distributed, i.e., log H rv N(µH, a1), 
where µH and a1 are the mean and the variance of H, respectively. This distribu-
tion is often used since it is skewed to the right and takes only positive values. 
The moments of H are as follows: 
E[H] == eµH+(o-1-I-/ 2 ), 
Var [ HJ == e2 (µH+o-i) _ e2 µH+o-1-I-. 
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4.5.1 Advanced economies 
First, we consider a group of three advanced economies. E[ H] of these three 
economies are the same, 28 but Var[H] are different. We use three values for a-H, 
0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 and change µH in order to keep E[ H] == e1.8 ~ 6.04965 intact 
for all three simulations. These economies consist of 1000 dynasties indexed by 
i == 1 ... 1000 and are identical except for the initial human capital distribution. 29 
The evolution of the growth rate of output per worker and the coefficient of vari-
ation of output per worker are the particular focus. 30 As we have seen in the last 
section, the coefficient of variation in Period t ( Ct) defined below is used to describe 
the evolution of inequality: 
1 
Ct == '°'1000 i 
µq ,t .L...Ji=l Wt 
1000 L wt ( Q~ - µq ,t) 2 , 
i=l 
where µq,t is the mean of income in Period t, w; is the number of workers of dynasty 
i in Period t and w~ == 1 for all i so that ~~~~o wf == 1000. 
Simulation procedures are straightforward. First, given the initial distribution 
of human capital, the number of children is determined by Equation ( 4.13) and 
by the fact that we have constrained n to have a positive lower bound. That 
is, if Equation ( 4.13) implies n < 1, we replace this with n == 1. Second, the 
evolution of human capital can be derived, using Equation ( 4.12) when n > 1, or 
we use Equation (4.14) when n == 1. Third, investment in education h can be 
derived using Equation (4.11) or Equation (4.15) depending upon the value of n, 
and working time l and output Q can be calculated using Equations ( 4. 2) and ( 4.1), 
28The Barro and Lee (1993) dataset has 101 observations for average schooling years in total 
population over age 25 in 1960. For the bottom 34 countries, the average is 0.93997. For the top 
34 countries, the average is 6.16544. E[H] for developing countries and advanced countries are 
set close to these values, respectively. 
29 Mathematica is used to generate 1000 random numbers of initial H. 
30We define workers as young parents who engage in production of the goods. 
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respectively. Finally, the growth rate of output per worker and the coefficient of 
variation can be calculated as we can calculate the change in the number of workers 
over time using the information on n, 1r1 , and 1r2 . 
The simulation results are described graphically in Figures 4.10 and 4.11.31 
Figure 4.10 shows that three economies will evolve differently in the short run but 
will asymptotically approach the same per-worker growth rate in the long run. Note 
that these are growth rates over a generation, which is about 25 years. 
As we have conjectured, the more equal an economy is, the faster it grows, and 
the difference of growth rates appears quite significant especially in the beginning. 
The intuition behind this is as explained in the last section. Whilst the difference 
in the change in the aggregate output of these economies is relatively small, the 
difference in the change in workers is significant, i.e., more equal economies have 
lower growth of the work force. This makes the growth rate of the more equal 
economy higher than that of the more unequal economy. 
31 Data62 is the most equal economy and Data68 is the least equal economy. 
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In turn, let us look at the coefficient of variation in shown Figure 4.11. It is 
apparent that all countries will approach their long run levels of inequality eventu-
ally. 
Remark 4. The coefficient of variation of output per worker will asymptotically 
approach a constant. 
Proof. From Remarks 2 and 3, the growth rate of output per worker will asymp-
totically approach a constant. Since the coefficient of variation is invariant to scale, 
the coefficient of variation of output per worker will asymptotically approach a 
constant. • 
It is also clear that there is no change in the inequality ranking, i.e., a country 
that is more equal than the other one in the beginning will not become more 
unequal. 
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Now we turn to examine a group of three middle-income economies. The initial 
E[ H] of these countries are the same and now they are set to approximately 2.01. I 
again use the same values of O"H, and change µHin order to keep E[H] == e0·7 ~ 2.01 
intact for all simulations. All simulation procedures are the same as in the previ-
ous subsection. The simulation results are described graphically in Figures 4.12 
and 4.13. 32 
As we have conjectured, we observe at first a more equal country growing faster 
than a less equal country. The intuition behind this is the dominance of the differ-
ence in the change in workers. The worker growth rate in a more unequal country is 
much higher than that in a more equal country. Although there are more dynasties 
that produce a lot in the more unequal country, their contribution will be more 
than off set by this increase in workers. 
32 Data22 is the most equal economy and Data28 is the least equal economy. 
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The difference in the coefficients of variation for three economies is shown in 
Figure 4.13. As in the previous case, one can observe no changes in the inequal-
ity ranking, i.e., a country that is initially more unequal will end up being more 
unequal. However, if we look at the evolution of the coefficient of variation of the 
most unequal economy, we can see that this economy is becoming at first less equal, 
then more equal over time until it converges to the long run level of inequality. The 
latter result arises mainly from the fact that there are many more dynasties that 
are catching up (growing faster than) other dynasties that are already on the linear 
segment of the phase line. The decrease in inequality will asymptotically approach 
zero for the same reason as in the previous subsection ( see Remark 4). 
4.5.3 Developing economies 
Finally, we consider a group of three developing economies that have not begun the 
demographic transition, where E[H] << HB. The initial E [H ] of these countries are 
the same but now they are far below HB. We again use the same three values of 
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O"H, and change µH in order to keep E [ H] == e0 == l intact for all simulations. After 
going through the same simulation procedures as in the previous subsections, we 
get the following simulation results that are described graphically in Figures 4.14 
and 4.15. 33 
The figure shows that a more equal country will grow faster ( decline slower) in 
the beginning but the relationship will be reversed after a while. This situation is 
the one given as an example in the last paragraph of Subsection 4.4.1. However, 
the results are most likely to differ according to the different parameter values . 
An important thing to note here is that the difference in growth rates of output 
per worker is rather small compared to the cases for advanced and middle-income 
economies. The parameter values appear to affect the qualitative implication of 
inequality for subsequent growth, but the quantitative implication appears to be 
rather insignificant. 
The difference in the evolution of the coefficients of variation is shown in Fig-
33Data12 is the most equal economy and Data18 is the least equal economy. 
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ure 4.15 . This figure shows that these economies will approach the state where 
every dynasty is completely equal, whatever the initial distributions are. This hap-
pens because all growing dynasties (in terms of output) will be disappearing in the 
long run because of a constant survival probability whereas all declining dynasties 
(in terms of output) will be approaching the steady state. 
4.5.4 Inequality matters 
It appears that inequality matters especially when middle-income and advanced 
economies are concerned. Regarding developing countries, the implication is not 
that obvious. The following conjecture, which could be tested against the real data, 
concludes this section. 
Conjecture 1. The implication of inequality for the per-worker growth rate de-
pends upon an economy 7s demographic stage of development. For an economy that 
has already begun the demographic transition, inequality is likely to impede subse-
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quent growth in any case. But for an economy that has not begun the demographic 
transition} inequality may not have any significant effect} and the direction of the 
effect is ambiguous. 
4.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has focused upon the relationship between education, fertility, and 
growth. In the OLG model we have explored, endogenous growth is driven by 
the accumulation of human capital, which is jointly determined with fertility. The 
model explains the negative relationship betv,een growth ( or education) and fer-
tility, which distinguishes this chapter from the existing inequality-human capital-
growth literature where all individuals have the same number of children. Becker et 
al. (1990) have also explained this negative relationship between education and fer-
tility using a representative agent model framework. This chapter differs from their 
study because we have allowed individuals to be heterogeneous. This has enabled 
us to see if initial human capital distribution have any implication for subsequent 
economic growth, and if any, how the former affects the latter. 
In line with the existing literature, this chapter has shown that initial hu-
man capital distribution might have implications for subsequent economic growth. 
Whilst much of the existing empirical literature has identified a negative relation-
ship between inequality and growth, this chapter, in contrast, conjectures that the 
relationship might be dependent upon an economy's demographic stage of develop-
ment. Simulations in this chapter predicts that the relationship is negative as for 
middle-income and advanced economies that have begun the demographic transi-
tion, but that the relationship is ambiguous for developing countries that have not 
begun the demographic transition. 
We need to be aware that the model in this chapter focuses upon only one 
particular mechanism - the accumulation of human capital and fertility - by which 
inequality affects economic growth. As a number of empirical studies have shown, 
the overall inequality effect upon growth may be negative. In fact, many theoretical 
Education, fertility, and growth 100 
studies, which focus upon mechanisms aside from what we have looked at, have also 
suggested that inequality should impede growth. Nevertheless, this chapter has 
shown that, as long as this mechanism is concerned, the direction of the inequality 
effect upon growth may not always be negative, in contrast to the recent theoretical 
literature. This is the most interesting issue that is raised in the chapter. 
One major limitation of this model is that there is no interaction between the 
dynasties. Since there is no interaction between individuals, in the model, an 
economy is not well defined - it is just a set of dynasties we arbitrarily define. 
Furthermore, interaction between the dynasties, or individuals, may have important 
implication for the effect of inequality upon growth. Further research should be 
directed to incorporate interactions between individuals into the model. 34 
In the next chapter, we test our conjecture that has been derived from the model 
in this chapter - the non-monotonic nature of the effect of inequality upon growth. 
Testing the conjectures against real data is very important because the most of the 
analysis in this chapter is conducted numerically. The predictions of this chapter 
hinge heavily upon values of the parameters as well as the type of distribution 
assumed for the initial level of human capital. 
34We will discuss this issue in the concluding chapter. 
Chapter 5 
The non-monotonic nature of the 
effect of inequality upon growth 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has suggested an important economic conjecture on the re-
lationship between initial inequality and subsequent growth - the non-monotonic 
nature of the effect of inequality upon growth. This chapter attempts to test this 
interesting co-njecture by utilising the newly compiled inequality data by Deininger 
and Squire (1996). 
This is considered to be a challenging attempt. As we have seen in Chapter 
2, a number of empirical studies have found a negative and statistically signifi-
cant relationship between inequality and growth. Recently, some studies (Forbes, 
2000 and Li and Zou, 1998) have found a positive relationship between inequality 
and growth, but they focus upon the relationship in the short run (5 years) utilis-
ing panel data. A common agreement that a relationship between inequality and 
growth is negative in the long run appears to stand firmly. 
The conjecture is based upon the theoretical model from the previous chapter, 
in which inequality impacts growth through both human capital accumulation and 
fertility. Perotti (1996) is the only empirical study that has genuinely attempted 
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to uncover the effect of inequality upon growth through both human capital accu-
mulation and fertility. He has claimed that this decision is jointly made, and that 
the relationship between inequality and growth is negative. 
This study is similar to Perotti (1996) but is different in the following three 
points. First, Perotti's (1996) empirical specification is ad hoc and is not derived 
from a theoretical model, so a number of different interpretation of the results 
could be possible. In contrast, the theoretical model in the previous section en-
ables us to give us a unique interpretation to the estimation results in this study. 
The specification of the empirical model is based upon that in Perotti (1996) but 
we modify his econometric specification in order for it to be consistent with our 
theoretical model. Second, related to this first point, since our model tells us that 
the effect of inequality depends upon an economy's demographic stage of devel-
opment, we attempt to specify the system so that we can identify the effects of 
inequality upon different types of economies. Some empirical studies such as Barro 
(2000) and Deininger and Squire (1998) also conjecture the non-monotonic effects 
of inequality upon growth ( for different reasons from ours). They separate their 
samples into two according to some criteria, such as an income level or a degree 
of democracy. 1 In this chapter, however, we use a different method in order to 
identify the development-stage-dependent effects. Finally, we utilise an inequality 
data set compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996), which was not available when 
Perotti (1996) conducted his study. This data set could be called industry standard 
by now as all the recent empirical studies on inequality (Forbes, 2000, Barro, 2000, 
Deininger and Squire, 1998, and Li and Zou, 1998) use it. The use of this data set 
1The results of these studies are not of interest here. Barro (2000) looks at the short-run effects 
of inequality on growth and also has a problem in his estimation technique . The random effect 
panel estimation is used on panel data, but since the data are actually dynamic that include initial 
income, the random effect estimation produces an inconsistent estimator; see Arellano and Bond 
(1991). Deininger and Squire (1998) look at the long run story, but separate sample according to 
whether a country is democratic or not. Their study finds that the effect of inequality does not 
exist in democratic societies. 
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alleviates the estimation bias from the possible measurement error. We will have a 
close look at this data set in Section 5.3. 
The data appear to support a part of the conjecture from the previous chapter, 
i.e., the effect of inequality upon growth appears to be non-monotonic. However, 
the data do not appear to support the claim that inequality does not have any 
significant effect for economies that have not begun the demographic transition. 
It does appear to have a significant and positive effect for these economies. The 
rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 recaps the conjectures from 
the previous chapter and specifies the empirical model. Section 5.3 describes the 
data set we use, paying special attention to the inequality data set compiled by 
Deininger and Squire (1996). Section 5.4 conducts estimations and analyses the 
results. Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Conjectures and the empirical model 
First, we split the conjecture from the previous chapter into two for convenience: 
Conjecture 2. The implication of inequality for the per-worker growth rate de-
pends upon an economy's demographic stage of development. 
Conjecture 3. For an economy that has already begun the demographic transition, 
inequality is likely to impede subsequent growth. But for an economy that has not 
begun the demographic transition, inequality may not have any significant effect, 
and the direction of the effect is ambiguous. 
The objective of chapter is two verify if these conjectures are true. The proce-
dure is very simple. To begin with, we specify the empirical model as follows: 
965-90 == f (lny55, PPP J55, F EDU65-9o), 
F EDU65-9o == g(F ERT65-9o, GIN 165, F HC65), (5.1) 
F ERT65-9o == h(F EDU6o, F ERT6o, F HC6o, POP55), 
The non-monotonic effect of inequality 104 
where 965-90 is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per worker 1965-1990, 
lny65 is a logarithm of real GDP per worker in 1965 that captures convergence, 
PPP f 65 is the PPP value of the investment deflator as an indication of price dis-
tortion, relative to that of the United States in 1965, F ERT65 _90 is the net fertility 
rate, 2 average of 1960 and 1990 values, GIN [ 65 is the Gini coefficient in or around 
1965,3 F EDU65-90 is the female gross enrolment ratio for secondary education, av-
erage of 1960 and 1990 values, and F HC65 is average years of secondary schooling 
in the female population over age 25 in 1965.4 F EDU60 , F ERT60 , and F HC60 
are the 1960 values of F EDU65 _90 , F ERT65 _90 , and F HC65 _ 90 , respectively, and 
PO P65 is total population in 1965. 
System (5.1) consists of three equations. The first is a growth equation where 
the growth rate of real GDP per worker is explained by the initial level of real 
GDP per worker, the degree of price distortion in the economy, and investment 
in education. 5 In turn, the second equation shows that investment in education 
depends upon various variables including the net fertility rate, which is jointly 
determined with investment in education. This equation is derived from the results 
of the previous chapter, a point we will come back to shortly. In order to complete 
the system, we need an equation that explains cross-country variations in fertility. 
There appear to be many factors that explain differences in the fertility rate across 
countries, such as the difference in child rearing costs, the differences in religious 
and social norms, the difference in knowledge of contraception, etc, and estimating 
this equation per se will be worth a paper. Since our main objective is to uncover 
the effect of inequality upon growth, we will not attempt to estimate the whole 
system. Instead, we postulate in the third equation in System ( 5.1) that fertility 
2N et fertility rate is defined as total fertility rate times ( 1 - infant mortality rate in the first 
year of life). 
3 Details on how we compile the Gini coefficient will be discussed in Section 5.3 . 
4 See Section 5.3 for the data sources of these variables. 
5We also include regional dummies in this equation but will omit them until Section 5.4 for 
brevity. 
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is explained by the initial population and lagged fertility and education variables, 
i.e., we will instrument fertility by these variables. Issues regarding the choice 
of instruments will be discussed in Section 5.4, where we conduct estimation and 
sensitivity analysis. 
Two other issues regarding this system of equations should be discussed. 6 First, 
most of the empirical studies that relate education to growth use both male and 
female education variables or the aggregated one, whereas in this chapter, we use 
only female education variable. A rationale for doing this is that the female edu-
cation appears more relevant in relation to the model in the previous chapter. The 
crucial aspect of the model is that individuals make a joint decision over fertility 
and investment in human capital. Evolutions of population and stock of human 
capital, which are crucial in determining the growth rate of output per worker, rely 
upon that decision by individuals. In the model, there is no gender, but in reality, 
it is much more likely to be the female that faces the decision. 
In fact, the issue about coefficients on male and female education variables 
has been controversial. Barro and Lee ( 1994), using cross-country estimation, find 
that male education contributes positively to growth but female education retards 
growth, therefore stress the importance of male education. In contrast, Caselli 
et al. (1996), using the dynamic panel GMM estimation, find the exact opposite 
- female education contributes to growth but male education has negative effects 
upon growth. Some studies such as Mankiw et al. (1992) use the average enrolment 
ratio for all working-age population and find the contribution to growth positive 
and significant. We will stick to our interpretation of the model and use female 
education, but given this unrobustness of the estimates, we will check the sensitivity 
of the result using the education variables for the entire working-age population. 
Second, if we look at a growth equation in System (5.1) it is the flow of education 
that influences growth. In some studies, however, it is the stock of education that 
counts for growth. It depends upon the theoretical model as to which of these two 
6 Recall that we have briefly discussed these issues in Subsection 2.3.12 in Chapter 2. 
The non-monotonic effect of inequality 106 
variables is used. If endogenous growth is postulated, it is a level of human capital 
stock that matters to growth in the long run, so the initial stock of education enters 
the growth equation (Barro and Lee, 1994). On the other hand, if the Swan-Solow 
growth model is behind the empirical model, it is investment in human capital that 
matters during transition ( since long-run growth is given exogenously), so the flow 
of education is employed (Mankiw et al., 1992). 
Our system has both of these flavours. As we have seen, growth is directly 
dependent upon the flow of human capital in our specification. This comes from 
the fact we are looking at growth between two consecutive periods in the short run 
( although it is 25 years). Note, however, that in turn, the flow of human capital is 
dependent upon the stock of human capital, and that our system can be reduced 
as follows: 
965-90 == f(lny55, PPP !55, 9(F ERT65-9o, GIN J55, F HC55)). (5.2) 
Therefore, indirectly the level of human capital stock is important in determining 
growth, which is consistent with the theoretical framework underlying this empirical 
system, which is an endogenous growth model. 
Now, given that fertility is instrumented by the predetermined variables, we try 
to estimate the following econometric model similar to Perotti (1996): 
965-90 == 0:'.1 + a2lny55 + a3P PP !55 + a4F EDU65-90 + E1, 
F EDU65-9o == /31 + f32GI N !55 + /33F HC65 (5.3) 
+f34F ERT65-9o + /35F ERT65-9oGI N !55 + E2. 
What are the expected signs of the coefficients? Regarding a growth equation, 
we expect a 2 < 0 if there is a convergence effect, a 3 < 0 as price distortion in the 
market is considered to retard economic performance, and a 4 > 0 because invest-
ment in education contributes to economic growth. As for the second equation, 
note that we can rewrite it as follows: 
F EDU65-9o == /31 + /33F HC65 + /34F ERT65-9o + (/32 + /35F ERT65-9o)GI N !55 + E2. 
(5.4) 
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Due to the analysis in the previous chapter, we can expect that (33 > 0 and /34 > 0. 
In an economy with higher stock of human capital, the return on investment in 
human capital is higher, given any distribution of human capital, and therefore 
the investment in education is higher. Fertility is endogenously determined with 
investment in human capital and the relationship is postulated negative, which is 
emphasised more than enough in the previous chapter. The focus of this chapter is 
more upon the coefficient on G 1 N 165 . As we can see, the coefficient on G 1 N 165 is 
sum of /32 and /35F ERT65 _ 90 . Therefore, the effect of inequality upon investment 
in education depends upon these two things. We expect that the whole effect is 
expected to be negative according to the existing empirical work - more inequality 
will lead to less investment in education, and that leads to lower economic growth. 
If this is expected, we can expect that /32 is negative, which shows the common 
negative effect of inequality upon growth. Also, we can expect /35 is positive. 
Our conjecture implies that in economies that have not begun the demographic 
transition, the rate of fertility is likely to be higher. In these economies, negative 
effect of inequality represented by the first term may be offset by positive /35 together 
with high F ERT65 _ 90 to some extent so that the overall effect is insignificant. We 
shall come back to further interpretation of this coefficient in Section 5.4 where we 
actually conduct the estimation. Before carrying out this interesting estimation, 
however, let us have a look at the data set we use. 
5.3 Description of data 
We use an inequality data set compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996) as in the 
most of the recent empirical literature. Some of the important characteristics of 
this data set are summarised, whilst more detailed explanation can be found in 
their original article. 
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5.3.1 Measure of inequality 
The Gini coefficient is chosen as a measure of inequality for the empirical analysis. 
Given from the previous studies that aggregate results are similar for different 
measures of inequality, 7 it should be best to utilise it since it is most widely reported 
in official sources that are based upon primary data. 
5.3.2 Quality of this data set 
Deininger and Squire (1996) select 682 "high quality" inequality data out of more 
than 2600 data sources according to three selection criteria. First, they require 
that inequality data should be based upon actual observation of individual units 
drawn from household surveys. Therefore, data sets based upon synthetic estimates 
of inequality using national accounts and some sort of assumed functional form of 
income distribution will be excluded from this data set. 
Second, they require that inequality data should cover all the population. It 
is well known that differences between Gini coefficients based upon a subset of 
the population and those based upon a nationally representative sample can be 
substantial. 
Third, comprehensive coverage of different income sources are required. Exclu-
sion of non-monetary income as well as non-wage earnings might have significant 
effect upon Gini coefficients. 
One important thing to note here is the following. Data sets that have been 
used in the existing literature may be of doubtful quality if we apply these three 
criteria. Persson and Tabellini (1994) have detected a negative relationship be-
tween inequality and growth using their 55 country data set (gathered from various 
sources). But only 18 out of 55 data are in high quality, and Deininger and Squire 
(1996) claim that use of this reduced data undermines their finding. 
7See Anand and Kanbur (1993) for example. 
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5.3.3 Characteristics of this data set 
This data set has many more observations and covers more economies over longer 
periods than any other inequality data sets. However, Deininger and Squire (1996) 
note that we need to be careful when we want to compare one observation with 
another, because the definition of the coefficient differs across countries and over 
time. Three important differences are the focus. 
First, the inequality measure based upon individuals differs from that based 
upon households when there are systematic differences in size between rich and poor 
households. Household-based data give slightly lower inequality than individual-
based data, but the difference is not too large ( the mean difference of the coefficient 
is 1.67 percentage points). 
Second, use of bef~re-tax income should give a higher inequality measure than 
use of after-tax income. The quantitative importance of the redistributive tax's 
effect depends upon the progressivity and effectiveness of the tax system. The data 
show some difference ( the mean difference of about 3 percentage points) for the 
OECD economies, but this difference might be irrelevant for developing economies 
where the role of redistributive taxation is smaller. 
Finally, inequality in expenditure is usually smaller than inequality in income 
since it is much easier for individuals to smooth expenditure than to smooth in-
come. The data shows the systematic and significant difference between income-
based and expenditure-based inequality measures ( the mean difference is 6.6 per-
centage points). It is most preferable that we confine our analysis to measures that 
are defined consistently, i. e, use either income-based or expenditure-based mea-
sure. However, this will reduce the number of observation. In order to avoid this, 
Deininger and Squire (1996) suggest that we should correct the difference by adding 
the mean difference to expenditure-based observations. Of course, they also note 
the importance of checking the robustness of results to this correction. 
This comprehensive data set even allows us to conduct panel estimation, and in 
fact, some studies have already conducted it (Li and Zou, 1998, Barro, 2000, Forbes, 
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2000). As Forbes emphasises, panel estimation is preferred to cross-sectional esti-
mation for various reasons. Panel estimation can capture time-invariant systematic 
differences between countries that independent variables cannot capture, so the esti-
mation is not as prone to omitted variable problem as in cross-sectional estimation. 
It also provides us with effects of the independent variables upon dependent vari-
ables within a country, whereas cross-sectional estimation provides a relationship 
across countries. Bearing in mind these superiority in panel estimation, however, 
this study does not fully utilise the time dimension of this data set, i.e., we only use 
data for the Gini coefficient in 1965 ( or the year around 1965). This is due to the 
fact that our theoretical implication is related to the long run where one generation 
implies around 25 years. 
5.3.4 Compiling the initial Gini coefficient 
The following outlines the way the Gini coefficient data in 1965 used in this chapter 
is compiled. The (high quality) Gini coefficients in 1965 are available for only 56 
countries. In addition to this. we allow to include the nearest high-quality observa-
tion prior to 1965, if there is no observation for 1965. If we cannot find observations 
prior to 1965, we use the nearest observation after 1965 but no later than 1975. 
We also follow Barro (2000) in order to increase the number of the observations. 
Namely, we add observations that are excluded from the high-quality data set be-
cause their source was unidentified. The source being unidentified implies that 
these observations may not satisfy the second criteria - the data should cover all 
the population - but Barro (2000) argues these observations appear to be based 
upon representative national coverage. Again we look for the observations for 1965 
:first. If we cannot find them, we look for nearest observations prior to 1965, and 
then after 1965 but no later than 1975. If there are multiple observations in the 
same year, we use the average value of them. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for all countries 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
965-90 105 .0166417 .0175463 -.025103 .0662873 
GINiss 85 42.23183 9.970333 22.23 61.88 
PPPiss 118 .9265627 .467477 .194 3.3549 
lnyss 125 8.372516 1.019235 6.419995 10.24178 
FHCss 107 .4969626 .6127281 0 3.253 
FEDUss-9o 99 .3742273 .2752068 .015 .935 
FERTss-9o 113 4.469705 1.479164 1.766405 7.164125 
5.3.5 Other variables 
Data sources for other variables used in this chapter are as follows. The average 
annual growth rate of real GDP per worker 1965-1990 and real GDP per worker 
in 1965 are taken from the Penn World Table 5.6a (Summers and Heston, 1995). 
All the schooling variables, the net fertility rate, a price distortion variable,8 total 
population, and regional dummies are taken from Barro and Lee (1993) data set. 
For the flow variables, it is common to use the average of initial and terminal 
periods, but the data for schooling variable ( enrolment ratio) for 1990 is unavailable 
in Barro and Lee (1993), so we use 1985 instead and take the average of that and 
1965. We do the same for the net fertility rate. The descriptive statistics for the 
all observations are shown in Table 5.1. 
As it turns out in the next section, only 57 observations are available to estimate 
System (5.3) using the method of two-stage least squares. The descriptive statistics 
for that subset are shown in Table 5.2. Table 5.3 shows the detailed information 
on the Gini coefficient data for these 57 observations. Following the suggestion by 
Deininger and Squire (1996), we have added 6.6 to the Gini coefficient if the data 
source is expenditure-based, in running all the regressions throughout this chapter.9 
8 Following Perotti (1996), we use the PPP value of the investment deflator as an indication of 
price distortion, relative to that of the United States in 1965. 
9The Gini coefficient values in Table 5.3 are after-adjustment values. 
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Table 5.2: The relevant descriptive statistics for 57 countries 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev . Min Max 
965-90 57 .0182755 .0171273 -.0165344 .0662873 
GINI6s 57 42.97968 9.107882 24.3 61.88 
PPPiss 57 .7538105 .2979437 .194 2.1101 
lnyss 57 8.732098 .9049669 6.74052 10 .24178 
FHCss 57 .6433684 .7145447 .003 3.253 
FEDUss-9o 57 .4411403 .2719671 .015 .935 
FERT6s-9o 57 3.961862 1.494163 1.852062 7.164125 
5.4 The estimation results 
We estimate System (5 .3) using the method of two-stage least squares (2SLS). 9ss-9o 
F EDUss-9o, F ERTss-9o, and F ERT6s-9oGI N Iss are the three endogenous vari-
ables to the system, and exogenous variables are lny65 , PPPiss , GINiss, FHC6s, 
and the regional dummies, AS I AE, LAAM, and S AF RIC A. 10 As we have dis-
cussed in Section 5.2, we use 1960 values of F EDUss-9o, F ERTss-9o, and F HC6s 
as well as POP65 , as instruments . 
The estimation results for various specifications including System (5.3) are pre-
sented in Tables 5.4, 5.6, 5. 7, and 5.8. The Breusch-Pagan LM test is employed for 
every equation in order to check heteroskedasticity of the error term. Throughout 
the analysis, heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics will be reported if we reject the 
null hypothesis of homoskedasticity of_ the error term at 5 per cent. 
5.4.1 The non-monotonic effects of inequality upon growth 
Column (1) in Table 5.4 presents the estimation results for System (5 .3) . First, 
let us look at a growth equation in Column (1). The estimate of coefficients on 
lny65 is statistically significant at 1 per cent and the estimate of coefficient on 
F EDU65 _90 is statistically significant at 5 per cent. We observe the anticipated 
signs on coefficients, i.e., a negative coefficient on lny65 that captures the conver-
10These dummies are taken from Barro and Lee Data Set (1993) as well. 
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Table 5.3: The Gini coefficient for 5 7 countries 
Economy Source GINh5 Quality Economy Source GINl55 Quality 
Argentina Income 42.00 ps Mexico Income 55.50 accept 
Australia Income 32.02 accept Netherlands Income 28.60 accept 
Bangladesh Income 37.31 accept New Zealand Income 30.05 accept 
Benin Income . 42.12 ps Norway Income 37.52 accept 
Bolivia Income 49.60 ps Pakistan Expenditure 37.16 accept 
Brazil Income 53.00 accept Panama Income 57.00 accept 
Canada Income 31.61 accept Peru Income 55.00 accept 
Chile Income 45.64 accept Philippines Income 51.32 accept 
Colombia Income 52 .02 accept Portugal Income 40.58 accept 
Costa Rica Income 50.00 accept Senegal Income 57.37 ps 
Denmark Income 38.00 ps Sierra Leone Income 60 .79 accept 
Ecuador Income 35.00 ps Singapore Income 41.00 accept 
El Salvador Income 53.00 ps South Korea Income 34.34 accept 
Fiji Income 46.00 ps Spain Income 31.99 accept 
Finland Income 31.80 accept Sri Lanka Income 47.00 accept 
France Income 47.00 accept Sweden Income 33.41 accept 
Germany Income 28.13 accept Thailand Income 41 .28 accept 
Greece Expenditure 41.71 accept Togo Income 33.80 ps 
Honduras Income 61.88 accept Trinidad and Tobago Income 46.02 accept 
Hong Kong Income 40.90 accept Tunisia Expenditure 48.90 accept 
India Expenditure 37.74 accept Turkey Income 56 .00 accept 
Indonesia Expenditure 39.90 accept Uganda Income 40.07 ps 
Ireland Income 38.69 accept United Kingdom Income 24.30 accept 
Italy Income 41.00 accept United States Income 34.64 accept 
Jamaica Income 54.31 accept Venezuela Income 47.65 accept 
Japan Income 34.80 accept Yugoslavia Income 31.18 accept 
Kenya Income 48.80 ps Zambia Income 51.32 ps 
Malawi Income 46.08 ps Zimbabwe Income 46.00 ps 
Malaysia Income 50.00 accept 
NB: ps implies that the data are not included in the Deininger and Squire (1996) high quality data set as 
there is no clear reference to the primary source. 
gence effects, a negative coefficient on PPP ! 65 , albeit statistically insignificant, 
showing that price distortion in an economy is harmful to growth, and a positive 
coefficient on F EDU65 _ 90 implying that investment in education fosters economic 
growth. Regional dummies are also statistically significant at 1 per cent, Asian 
economies being estimated to have higher growth than Latin American and Sub-
Saharan African economies. 
In turn, let us look at the other equation in Column ( 1). All variables are 
estimated statistically significant at at least 5 per cent. Coefficients on F HC6s 
and FE RT65 _ 90 are in expected signs as we have discussed in Section 5.2 . Most 
interestingly and strikingly, the coefficient on GIN / 65 is negative and that on 
F ERT65 _ 90GI N / 65 is positive as we have anticipated. 
These results show that the effect of inequality upon growth through human cap-
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ital accumulation is statistically significant, and that the effect is non-monotonic. 
That is, Conjecture 2 appears to be supported by the data. Furthermore, the effect 
of inequality appears to be larger if a country has lower fertility. Let us check next 
if the effect is, at all, significant in terms of economics, 11 and try to interpret the 
results in line with the implication from the previous chapter. 
Table 5.4: Estimation results 
Our specification Reduced form Including direct effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable 965-90 FEDU6s-9o 965-90 965-90 965-9 0 FEDU6s-9o 
lny55 -0.012 -0.014 -0 .015 -0 .012 
(-3.263) (-4.250) (-4 .224) (-3.242) 
PPPJ55 -0.005 -0.002 -0 .010 -0.003 
(-0.846) (-0.485) (-1.749) (-0.584) 
FEDU6s-9o 0.025 0 .029 0.053 0.022 
(2.018) (2.454) (3.930) (1. 729) 
FERT65-9o -0.443 -0.443 
(-3.135) (-3.135) 
FHC5s 0.094 0.094 
(3.334) (3.334) 
GINJ5s -0.030 -0.0002 -0 .0003 -0.0001 -0.030 
(-2.080) (-0.850) (-1.060) (-0.554) (-2.080) 
FERT6s-9oGIN hs 0.007 0.007 
(2.163 ) (2.163) 
ASIAE 0.012 0.014 0.013 
(2.568) (2.499) (2.605) 
LAAM -0.013 -0.009 -0.012 
(-3.296) (-2.272) (-2.540) 
SAFRICA -0.027 -0.027 -0 .028 
(-4.326) (-5.766) (-4.310) 
constant 0.121 2.108 0.142 0.149 0.126 2.108 
( 4.422) (3.684) (5.830) (5.283) ( 4.312) (3 .684) 
Number of observations 57 57 60 60 57 57 
R2 0.6751 0 .8231 0.6977 0.3735 0 .6763 0.8231 
NB: Values in the parentheses are t statistics, but for those in the second equation of Column (2), which 
are heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics. 
5.4.2 Is the effect of inequality significant? 
Since the effect of inequality depends upon the level of F ERT65 _ 90 , we need to 
refer to the descriptive statistics in order to obtain a single magnitude. Results are 
summarised in Table 5.5 . 
When we evaluate the effect at the 57 country sample mean, the coefficient on 
11 We want to compare the magnitude of the inequality effect with that of the existing empirical 
studies. 
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Table 5.5: Effects of a one standard deviation increase in G l N 165 upon g65 _ 90 for 
different groups of economies 
Group of countries Change in FEDU65-9o Change in 965-90 
All 57 countries 
OECD 
Latin America 
Developing countries ( G DP65 < $2000) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
NB: GDP65 is the real GDP per worker in 1965. 
sample or subsample. 
-0.007 
-0.117 
0.032 
0.110 
0.134 
-0.0002 
-0.0028 
0.0008 
0.0027 
0.0033 
Values are evaluated at mean of 
GlNl65 in Equation (5.4) is negative, i.e., more inequality will have a negative 
effect on investment in human capital, and that will lead to lower growth. A one 
standard deviation increase in the Gini coefficient will lower investment of human 
capital (the female secondary school enrolment ratio) by about 0.007. This implies 
a decrease in the growth rate of GDP per worker by around 0.02 percentage points. 
The effect of inequality upon growth appears significantly small compared with 
what the .existing literature has found. 12 
When we evaluate the effect using the OECD country subsample mean, the 
coefficient on G l N 165 in Equation (5.4) is negative as well, i.e., inequality will have 
a negative impact upon investment in human capital, which will impede growth. 
However, the magnitude of the effect appears much more significant. A one stan-
dard deviation decrease in the Gini coefficient will lower investment in human 
capital by about 0.12, and this implies a decrease in the growth rate of GDP per 
worker by 0.28 percentage points. This magnitude is very similar to what Birdsall 
et al. (1995) has found, which is 0.32 percentage points. The effect of inequality 
upon growth appears to be sizable, considering that the standard deviation of the 
annual growth rate of real GDP per worker of our whole sample is around 1.8 per 
cent. 
12The effect ranges between 0.32 and 2.5 in the existing literature. See a review of the literature 
on Chapter 2. 
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In turn, if we look at a subsample of Latin American countries, the story looks 
a little different. For this sub-sample, a one standard deviation increase in the Gini 
coefficient will foster growth. However, the magnitude of this effect is only 0.08 
percentage points, which appears to be relatively small. This comparison between 
the OECD and Latin America appears to support our Conjecture 3 if we regard 
the latter as a region that has not begun the demographic transition. 
However, if we focus upon another developing country subsample, where we 
define developing countries as those whose real GDP per worker in 1965 is less 
than 2000 US Dollars, we find stronger and seemingly non-negligible inequality 
effects. For this sample, a one standard deviation increase in the Gini coefficient will 
increase investment in human capital by around 0.11, which increases the growth 
rate of GDP per worker by 0.27 percentage points. The magnitude is almost the 
same as that for the OECD but the direction is different. 
Recalling that inequality effects rest upon interaction between evolutions of 
super-rich and extreme-poor dynasties ( or the relative strength of the contributions 
of these two classes), we should interpret the results that in developing countries, 
super-rich effects have had much more than offset extreme-poor effects. This re-
sult appears to undermine the latter part of our Conjecture 3, however, it is not 
surprising to observe it. Recall that our conjectures are derived using numerical 
simulations and the results have appeared to be sensitive to the choice of parameter 
values. The simulation in the previous chapter has illustrated the case in which 
these two effects roughly offset each other in developing countries, but this empirical 
result suggests that it is not necessarily the case. 
Figure 5.1 plots the initial income levels against the predicted changes in the 
growth rate of real GDP per worker for each of countries in our 57 country sample, 
when the Gini coefficient decreases by one standard deviation, i.e., when an econ-
omy becomes more equal. The picture appears to convey the following facts. For 
either advanced or developing countries, inequality appears to have sizable effects 
upon growth, although the direction of the effect appears to be different - inequal-
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Figure 5.1: The predicted effects of a fall in inequality upon growth for each country 
ity impedes growth for the former but enhances growth for the latter. In contrast, 
for medium-income economies, the effects appear to be trivial. 
5.4.3 Model testing 
It is very important to check whether our specification is preferable to ones in the 
existing empirical studies. A number of empirical studies estimate the reduced form, 
i.e., they regress the growth rate of GDP per worker on various economic variables 
including a measure of inequality. Column (2) in Table 5.4 presents estimation 
results of a typical growth regression using our data set. The problem about this 
kind of estimation is that the interpretation of the coefficient on GIN 165 , i.e., we 
do not know how inequality is affecting the growth rate of output. In any case, 
the coefficient on GIN 165 is estimated to be negative but statistically insignificant. 
Some studies have found that it happens when regional dummies are included 
in the equation, implicating possible high correlation between inequality and the 
regional dummies. However, the results in Column (3) shows that this is not the 
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case. Even when regional dummies are excluded from the equation, the estimate 
of the coefficient on GIN ! 65 remains statistically insignificant. Again we observe 
improvement in a t statistic of the distortion variable, which may imply its possible 
strong relationship with regional dummies. 13 We conclude that, from this reduced 
form regression, we find no relationship between inequality and growth. 
Table 5.6: Estimation results ( continued) 
A la Perotti (1996) A la Perotti (1996) Instrumenting FE RTs5-90 
5) (6) (7, 
Dependent variable 965-90 FEDUss-9o 965-90 FEDUss-9o 965-90 FEDU6s-9o 
lnyss -0.018 0.069 -0.013 0.169 -0.012 
(-4.202) (2.687) (-2.480) (6.507) (-3.263) 
PPPlss -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
(-0.672) (-0.687) (-0.846) 
FEDUs5-9o 0.051 0.027 0.025 
(3.338) (1.339) (2.018) 
FERTss-9o -0.107 -0.139 
(-6.670) (-10.27) 
FHCss 0.081 0.094 0.108 
(3.212) (2.792) ( 4.458) 
GIN!ss -0.001 -0.007 0.001 
(-0.377) (-3.518) (0.444) 
FERTss-9oGINlss 
ASIAE 0.011 0.014 0.012 
(2.329) (3.043) (2.568) 
LAAM -0.009 -0.012 -0.013 
(-1.999) (-2.681) (-3.296) 
SAFRICA -0.024 -0.027 -0.027 
(-3.594) (-4.024) (-4.326) 
constant 0.161 0.242 0.124 -0.776 0.121 0.887 
(5.128) (0.969) (3.457) (-3.163) ( 4.422) (10.81) 
Number of observations 57 57 59 59 57 57 
R2 0.6420 0.8780 0.6902 0.7629 0.6751 0.8607 
NB: Values in the parentheses are t statistics. Column (5) is a quasi-replication of Columns (1) and (8) 
of Table 13 in Perotti (1996) and Column (6) is a quasi-replication of Columns (1) and (7) of Table 13 in 
Perotti (1996). 
One up-side of estimating the reduced form is that we could regard it as if 
GIN f 65 is capturing every effect of inequality upon growth. That is, although our 
specification allows us to tell how inequality affects growth - through human capital 
accumulation and the rate of fertility, there might be some other channels through 
which inequality could affect growth. 14 One way to capture this possible effects of 
inequality is to introduce GIN ! 65 in to the first equation of System (5.3). Column 
13We come back to this issue in Subsection 5.4.4. 
14See a review of the literature in Chapter 2. 
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( 4) presents the results of this estimation. The estimates for the second equation 
do not change as we did not introduce new instruments. As for the first equation, 
in comparison with our specification, note that the magnitude of the coefficient on 
F EDUs5-90 does not change much. This implies that the effect of inequality upon 
growth through human capital accumulation and fertility does not change much, 
either, even when the direct inequality effect is taken into account. The estimates of 
the coefficient on GIN 165 , which captures direct effects of inequality upon growth, 
is negative as we have expected, but is statistically insignificant. It appears the 
direct effect does not exist. 
Finally, we compare our results with Perotti (1996). Column (5) in Table 5.6 
presents estimation results based upon a model specification a la Perotti (1996). 
The important thing to note here is that Perotti (1996) does not treat F ERT65 _ 90 
as an endogenous variable, although he follows the endogenous fertility approach. 
Therefore, in estimating Column (5), we do not use instruments to control for 
F ERTs5-90· Perotti (1996) also includes lny65 (he uses GDP65 ) but does not include 
the interaction term, F ERT65 _90 GI N 165 , which is crucial to the non-monotonic 
nature of the effect of inequality upon growth. 15 The estimates of coefficients on 
F ERT65 _ 90 and F HC65 are quite close to those in Perotti (1996), confirming that 
our data are similar to what he has used. 
The estimate of the coefficient on GIN 165 is negative but statistically insignifi-
cant, which is identical to what Perotti (1996) has found. 16 Perotti (1996) argues 
that this is due to the inclusion of F ERT65 _ 90 . That is, Perotti (1996) finds a nega-
tive and statistically significant coefficient on GIN I 65 if FE RT65 _ 90 is not included 
in the equation. He argues that, since in an endogenous fertility approach, invest-
ment in education is mainly dependent upon fertility, income distribution largely 
affects investment in education through its effects upon the rate of fertility. There-
15 Another difference is that Perotti (1996) uses regional dummies in the second equation in-
stead of using them in the first one. All regional dummies turn out to be insignificant for this 
specifi.ca tion. 
16Recall our discussion in Subsections 2.3.11 and 2.3.12 in Chapter 2. 
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fore, once F ERT65-90 is controlled for, it is not surprising to see that inequality 
has no explanatory power. In fact, when we estimate the identical system without 
FE RT65-90, we find a negative and significant ( at 1 per cent) estimate of the coeffi-
cient on GIN !55 . The results are presented in Column (6) . However, the estimate 
of the coefficient on FE DU65 _90 is statistically insignificant , and so is the effect of 
inequality through investment in human capital. 
In any event, Perotti's (1996) argument sounds a little odd, as on one hand 
he claims that investment in human capital and fertility are jointly determined, 
whilst on the other hand he treats the former as endogenous and the latter as 
exogenous to the system.17 So in Column (7), we present estimation results when 
we instrument fertility (F ERT65 _90 ) in Column (5) .18 This specification is the same 
as ours (See Column ( 1) in Table 5.4) except that it does not include the interaction 
term, FE RT65 _ 90 G IN / 65 , which captures the non-monotonic nature of the effects 
of inequality upon growth we have conjectured. 
The estimate of the coefficient on GIN / 65 is positive, against our prediction, but 
is statistically insignificant. When we include the interaction term as in Column (1) 
in Table 5.4, estimates of coefficients on both GIN / 65 and F ERT65 _90Gl N 165 be-
come statistically significant ( at 5 per cent), and are in anticipated signs. The fact 
that inequality is not statistically significant just by itself, but is statistically signif-
icant with the interaction term, could be regarded as an indication that inequality 
has a non-monotonic impact upon growth. Having said so, however, there is no 
strong evidence that our specification is superior to other specifications on other 
statistical grounds. 
In summary, our three-equation system, which is based upon the theoretical 
model and the conjecture from the previous chapter, gives us much clearer interpre-
tation of the estimated coefficients. However, the question whether our specification 
is statistically preferred to other ones remains unsolved for future research . 
17In fact, Perotti (1996) does not state which of these specifications is preferable. 
18Zny65 is excluded from the second equation in order to make it similar to our specification. 
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5.4.4 Sensitivity of the results 
In concluding the empirical analysis, we check the sensitivity of these results. The 
results appear to be fairly robust to changes in specification we have discussed in 
Section 5.2 as well as to changes in the correction of the Gini coefficient data. 
Table 5. 7: Estimation results ( continued) 
No regional dummies No GINI adjustment No instruments 
(8) (9) (10) 
Dependent variable 965-90 FEDUss-9o 965-90 FEDUss-9o 965-90 FEDU6s-9o 
lny55 -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 
(-2.472) (-3.266) (-1.517) 
PPPl5s -0.017 -0.005 -0.005 
(-2.608) (-0.846) (-1.046) 
FEDU6s-9o 0.040 0.025 0.011 
(2.706) (2.022) (0.494) 
FERT6s-9o -0.533 -0.398 -0.145 
(-2.301) (-3.075) (-0.990) 
FHC5s 0.094 0.098 0.099 
(3.138) (3.627) (3.671) 
GINiss -0.040 -0.027 0.002 
(-1.786) (-1.874) (0.139) 
FERT6s-9oGIN lss 0.010 0.007 -0.0001 
(1.729) (1.996) (-0.033) 
ASIAE 0.012 0.012 
(2.568) (1. 761) 
LAAM -0.013 -0.015 
(-3.295) (-3.660) 
SAFRICA -0.027 -0.029 
(-4.326) (-4.590) 
constant 0.106 2.482 0.121 1.943 0.100 0.884 
(3.365) (2. 787) (4.425) (3.572) (2.482) (1.486) 
Number of observations 57 57 57 57 57 57 
R2 0.3435 0.7762 0.6752 0.8345 0.6587 0.8564 
NB: Values in the parentheses are t statistics, but for those in the second equation of Column (8) and in 
the first equation in Column (10), which are heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics. 
Column (8) in Table 5. 7 shows that the results are fairly robust to the exclusion 
of regional dummies. The notable change here is that a price distortion variable 
turns statistically significant once regional dummies are excluded. 19 It may be the 
case that the degree of price distortion is strongly correlated with regional dummies, 
and therefore it does not have any explanatory power in the first specification 
(Column (1) ). 
Regarding the inequality data, when values are expenditure based, we have 
added 6.6 to them as Deininger and Squire (1996) has suggested ( see Section 5.3 
19We observed a similar result when we compared Columns (2) and (3). 
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for discussion). When we estimate our system without this correction (See Column 
(9)), we find no distinct differences between the results. 
Column (10) shows the estimation results when no additional instruments are 
used to control for fertility in the system. We observe drastic changes. In particular, 
note that estimates of coefficients on fertility, inequality, and the interaction term 
of those two are not significant. This result may be suggesting that the instruments 
we have used could be appropriate. In fact, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reject the 
null hypothesis that both FE RT65 _ 90 and FE RT65 _ 90G IN 165 are exogenous to the 
system at 10 per cent. 20 Hence, our strong prior belief that fertility is endogenously 
determined with investment in human capital is statistically supported, although 
the level of significance is at 10 per cent. 
Next, as we have discussed in Section 5.2, we now check if the use of aggregated 
education, instead of female education, will change the results. Column (11) in 
Table 5.8 shows that the results do not change much both in terms of magnitude of 
coefficients and the statistical significance, which is rather surprising given examples 
from existing studies. 
When we look at the magnitude of the effects of inequality upon growth for 
each of the above specifications, we find little difference between them. Table 5.9 
summarises the effects of a one standard deviation increase in the Gini coefficient 
upon the growth rate of real GDP per worker for a 57 country sample. The effects 
appear to be trivial in any case, the magnitude of the effects ranging between -0.02 
and 0.06 percentage points. 
Finally, we test the stability of coefficients across the OECD and the non-OECD 
subsamples. Column (12) and Column (13) present the estimation results for these 
two subsamples. 21 As for the OECD subsample, signs of coefficients are estimated 
20 An F statistic for this test is 2. 75 and a p-value is 0.0738. See Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1993, Chapter 7) for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
21 Note that regional dummies are dropped for the both columns. For Column (12) this is due 
to the fact that these dummies are all zero for the OECD countries. In order to make it consistent 
with Column (12), regional dummies are dropped in Column (13) as well. However, we keep using 
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Table 5.8: Estimation results ( continued) 
Aggregated education OECD only Non-OECD only 
(11) ( 12) (13) 
Dependent variable 965-90 EDU65-90 965-90 FEDU65-9o 965-90 FEDU65-9o 
lny55 -0.011 -0.023 -0.015 
(-3.086) (-5.903) (-2.923) 
PPPfs5 -0.004 -0.003 -0.012 
(-0.804) (-0.204) (-1.756) 
FEDU6s-9o 0.023 0.072 
(1.796) (2.433) 
EDU6s-9o 0.024 
(1.770) 
FERT55_90 -0.426 -0.696 0.488 
(-3.456) (-1.039) (l.265) 
FHC55 0.109 -0.011 
(2.388) (-0.065) 
HC55 0.074 
(2.801) 
GINI5s -0.031 -0.030 0.078 
(-2.462) (-0.858) (1.624) 
FERT6s-9oGINlss 0.007 0.011 -0.015 
(2.407) (o. 762) (-1.579) 
ASIAE 0.013 
(2.784) 
LAAM -0.012 
(-2.830) 
SAFRICA -0.026 
(-4.051) 
constant 0.112 2.142 0.225 2.394 0.132 -2.258 
( 4.34 7) ( 4.316) (7.518) (1.507) (3.578) (1.200) 
Number of observations 58 58 19 19 38 38 
R2 0.6697 0.8250 0.7939 0.5850 0.3546 0.3490 
NB: Values in the parentheses are t statistics, but for those in the first equation of Column (13), which 
are heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics. EDU65-90 and HC55 are the total gross enrolment ratio for 
secondary education and average years of secondary schooling in the total working population. Together 
with FERT50 and POP5s, HC50, average years of secondary schooling in the total working population in 
1960, and EDU50, the 1960 value of the total gross enrolment ratio for secondary schooling are used as 
additional instruments for Column (11) estimation, instead of FHC50 and FEDU50. 
as anticipated, but most of the estimates including those of coefficients on GIN [55 
and FE RT65 _ 90G IN 165 _ 90 are statistically insignificant. Regarding the non-O ECD 
subsample, all of the estimates in the second equation turn out statistically insignif-
icant and neither of them is in anticipated signs, the results which are difficult to 
interpret. The estimates of coefficients between the two subsamples appear to be 
quite different. In fact, the null hypothesis that all coefficients are stable across 
these subsamples is rejected at 1 per cent for each of the equations. 22 
regional dummies as instruments. 
22 Since we are using 2S1S estimation, the Chow test using an ordinary F statistic ( also known 
as the Chow statistic) is invalid in this case. Therefore, we employ the analog of the ordinary F 
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Table 5.9: Effects of a one standard deviation increase in GIN 165 upon 965 _ 90 for 
different specifications using a 57 country sample 
Column in result tables Change in F EDU6s-9o 
(1) -0.007 
(8) -0.014 
(9) -0.008 
(10) 0.015 
(11) -0.022 
Change in 965-90 
-0.0002 
-0.0006 
-0.0002 
0.0002 
-0.0005 
NB: Values are evaluated at mean of a 57 country sample. 
This result may be suggesting that the OECD subsample contains most of 
the economies that have already begun the demographic transition and that the 
non-OECD subsample contains most of the economies that have not begun the 
demographic transition. Recall that for the whole sample, the interaction term, 
F ERT65 _ 90GI N [65 , is included in estimation in order to capture (large) variation 
between economies across different demographic development stages. However, 
if each of the subsamples contains economies in the same stage of demographic 
development, variation between economies within each of the subsamples might 
not be so large. This may be the cause of this poor estimation result. 
Not much of the empirical growth literature has, in fact, tested the stability 
of coefficients. Much of the growth literature has not reported anything on this 
matter ( Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Barro and Lee, 1994, Birdsall, 1995, Caselli et 
al., 1996, Perotti, 1994), or at most, it splits the sample according to some criteria 
but does not conduct any formal test to check the stability of coefficients across 
subsamples (Barro, 2000, Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994, Deininger and Squire, 1998, 
Galor and Zang, 1997, Mankiw et al., 1992, Perotti, 1996). 23 This issue appears to 
require further investigation. 
statistic, which is suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, Chapter 7). The statistics for 
the first and second equations are 29.31 (3.72 <F[4,46]< 3.77) and 91.81 (3.41 <F[5,46]< 3.46), 
respectively (relevant critical values at 1 per cent are in brackets). 
23Forbes (2000) is the only inequality study that the author is aware of, which contains some 
formal testing for the stability of coefficients across subsamples. 
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5.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has attempted to test a challenging conjecture from the previous chap-
ter on a relationship between inequality and growth - inequality impedes growth 
for a country that has begun the demographic transition, but for a country that 
has not begun the demographic transition, it has no significant effects, and if any, 
the direction of the effect is ambiguous. 
Using slightly different econometric specification from Perotti (1996), this chap-
ter has shown that the effect of inequality upon growth is statistically significant 
and not negligible. Furthermore, the effects are shown to be dependent upon an 
economy's demographic stage of development - the non-monotonic nature of the 
effects of inequality upon growth is supported by the data. 
We need to be cautious to state the above implication because of the follow-
ing. First, this chapter particularly focussed upon human capital and fertility as 
economic factors that link inequality and economic growth. However, as a number 
of studies have shown, there are many other channels through which inequality 
might affect growth. This study does not encompass the effects of inequality upon 
growth through other possible channels ( although we checked that the direct effect 
of inequality is not present in an ad hoc manner). Second, there may be a potential 
problem that coefficients are unstable across subsamples , where further research 
should be directed. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the thesis. First, we summarise our findings emphasising 
our contribution to the literature. Then, we suggest some issues towards which 
further research should be directed. 
6.1 Summary of our findings 
6.1.1 Inequality is important 
First, we have found that inequality is an important policy issue. Alongside of a 
number of studies we have reviewed in Chapter 2, this thesis has found that the 
effect of inequality upon growth is sizable. 
6.1.2 Challenging the common agreement 
Our thesis has confirmed that inequality is important, but in a different way from 
most of other studies. We have challenged the common agreement that the relation-
ship between initial inequality and subsequent growth is negative, and have found 
the non-monotonic effect of inequality upon growth. In particular, whilst equality 
enhances growth in developed economies, inequality appears to enhance growth in 
less-developed economies. 
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6.1.3 Theoretical contribution 
In deriving this effect of inequality upon growth, we have particularly focussed 
upon investment in human capital and endogenous fertility as channels through 
which inequality affects growth. We have justified why we endogenise the fertility 
decision by individuals, emphasising a strong relationship between investment in 
human capital and fertility in Chapter 2. We have seen, in Chapter 2, that no 
theoretical study has attempted to deal simultaneously with inequality, fertility, 
investment in human capital, and growth. Our study has attempted to do this for 
the first time. 
Our starting point ( Chapter 3) was to incorporate endogenous fertility into the 
existing models that have dealt with inequality, human capital, and growth ( Galor 
and Zeira, 1993, Galor and Zang, 1997). This extended theoretical model has turned 
out to produce negative growth in general, which is unrealistic. When we endogenise 
fertility and different individuals have different number of children, poor individuals 
who have many children eventually dominate the economy and per capita income 
is destined to decline. This chapter has made clear the limitations of the Galor 
and Zeira (1993) type of theoretical framework for growth analysis. We have also 
emphasised in Chapter 3 that inequality has been dealt with inappropriately. The 
definition of inequality in Chapter 3, as well as in Galor and Zeira (1993) and Galor 
and Zang (1997) is the share of unskilled individuals in the total population. We 
have pointed out that this definition is problematic. 
Chapter 4 has overcome these problems. We have given a different interpretation 
to a model by Ehrlich and Lui (1991), which deals with human capital, fertility, and 
growth. Ehrlich and Lui (1991) look at an economy as a whole using a representative 
agent framework, but we have started with looking at heterogenous dynasties within 
an economy. Then, we have summed up these dynasties and focussed upon an 
economy as a whole. In this way, we incorporate inequality into their model, and 
it has enabled us to deal simultaneously with inequality, fertility, human capital, 
and growth. 
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The model's new feature is endogenous growth. An economy could exhibit 
positive growth even in the long run, which is impossible in a framework as in 
Chapter 3. We have focussed upon economies under two regimes - before and 
after the productivity take-off. The former is characterised by zero per-capita 
output growth and positive population growth in the long run, whereas the latter 
is characterised by positive per-capita output growth and constant population in 
the long run. The former type of economy resembles an economy we have described 
in Chapter 3, but depending upon parameter values, the model can also produce 
positive long run growth, hence it overcomes one of the problems in Chapter 3. We 
have also related these two regimes to demographic stages of development. More 
specifically, we have shown that the demographic transition is triggered by the 
productivity take-off. 
The problem regarding the definition of inequality has been overcome by the 
use of the coefficient of variation in output, which is a typical measure of inequality 
in the literature. However, this has made further mathematical analysis too com-
plex. We have used numerical simulations in analysing the effect of inequality upon 
growth. Since initial inequality is found to have no implication for growth in the 
long run, we have looked at growth during transition periods. 
Our numerical simulations have conjectured the non-monotonic nature of the 
effect of inequality upon growth. The differences in (extremely) poor and (super) 
rich dynasties between countries are highlighted. Rich dynasties contribute posi-
tively to growth of output per worker but poor dynasties contribute negatively to 
it. We have conjectured that in a matured economy where income level is already 
high, the difference in rich dynasties does not matter that much but the difference 
in poor dynasties counts substantially, so more inequality leads to lower growth. In 
contrast, in an economy where income level is still not high enough, the difference 
in (super) rich dynasties also counts substantially so the overall effect is ambiguous. 
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6.1.4 Empirical findings and contribution 
Our analyses in Chapter 4 hinge critically upon parameter values we have assumed, 
so it is very important to test our conjecture against the real data. Chapter 5 has 
conducted the empirical analysis and has found some supportive evidence for our 
theoretical predictions. 
Our prominent empirical contribution is that we estimated a structural econo-
metric model based upon our theoretical model in Chapter 4. This has allowed 
us to interpret the result clearly, which has been impossible in studies that have 
estimated a reduced form growth equation. 
Our system has taken into account that inequality affects growth through in-
vestment in human capital and fertility, and that fertility and investment in hu-
man capital are jointly determined, i.e ., they are endogenous to the system. We 
have used the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to check this endogeneity, and statistically 
shown that these variables are likely to be endogenous, which consolidates our prior 
belief through out this thesis. 
The non-monotonic nature of the effect of inequality upon growth is supported 
by the data. We have used an interaction term between inequality and fertility to 
capture the different inequality effect according to different demographic stages of 
development. We have calculated the effect of a one standard deviation increase in 
inequality upon growth, as other studies have. When we evaluate this effect using 
the OECD subsample mean, it is a decrease in the growth rate by 0.28 percentage 
points, so inequality has a sizable negative impact upon growth for these economies. 
In contrast, when we evaluate this effect using the developing country subsample 
mean, it is an increase in the growth rate by 0.27 percentage points, so inequality 
has a sizable positive impact upon growth. 
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6.2 Further research directions 
We should be aware that there are some related issues this thesis does not encom-
pass. In addition, some problems have been pointed out regarding our analyses in 
the previous chapters. Let us conclude this thesis by listing them where further 
research should be directed. 
This study has consolidated the understanding that inequality is an important 
policy issue - the effect of inequality upon growth is non-trivial. We would like to 
ask then "what should the governments do in order to promote growth?" Unfor-
tunately, the models we have dealt with do not have a government sector, so we 
cannot comment too much on this matter. We can only say that if an economy has 
not begun the demographic transition, policies that make it begin the demographic 
transition are in demand. We might be able to incorporate a government sector 
explicitly into the model, in which it collects tax and redistributes the revenue in 
terms of health expenditure or alternatives . As is pointed out in footnote 19 in 
Chapter 4, a significant increase in 1r1 , the probability of survival for children can 
make an economy begin the demographic transition. A government policy to im-
prove health care could be modelled relating health expenditure and 1r1 , and its 
implementation might be justified on the grounds that it might enable an economy 
to begin the demographic transition. 
Let us discuss another point regarding theoretical modelling. We have pointed 
out that the major problem in Chapter 4 is that there is no interaction between 
individuals. This nature of the model can be prone to a criticism that an economy 
does not mean anything. Incorporating externality in education might be a way to 
get round with this problem. If positive externality of education is present, we can 
define an economy as a set of people who can benefit from one another. Of course, 
this will make the model much more complicated, and the analytical solutions 
for the dynamics of an economy might not be obtained. Nevertheless, this is a 
very interesting issue to pursue as the long run implication will be much different 
under this situation. That is, poor dynasties will jump above the threshold level 
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eventually, enjoying the externality effect from rich dynasties, so even in a regime 
we described as before the productivity take-off ( Case I), an economy can begin 
the demographic transition and exhibit positive long run growth. 
Let us now turn to discuss empirical aspects. In Chapter 5, we have conducted 
sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our estimation results. Our results are 
found to be robust except when we divide our sample into OECD and non-OECD 
subsamples. We have statistically rejected the stability of coefficients across two 
subsamples at 1 per cent. We have pointed out the possibility that there might not 
be enough variation between countries within each of the subsamples, which could 
have lead to the poor estimation results. We also have pointed out that not much of 
the empirical growth literature has tested the stability of coefficients, but has tend 
to try to increase the number of observations instead. It appears we need to wait 
until further data become available so that enough variation between observations 
can be seen within each of the subsamples. 
Another interesting empirical discussion stems from a study by Forbes (2000) 
that looks at the effect of inequality upon growth in the short run ( 5 years). The 
use of panel estimation enables Forbes (2000) to control for time-invariant country-
specific effects, which in turn, eliminates a potential source of omitted-variable bias. 
Our study has focussed upon long run growth since one period is 25 years in our 
theoretical model. There is no reason to assume that time-invariant country-specific 
effects do not exist, but again, due to limited data our estimation is restricted to 
cross-sectional, which cannot take country-specific effects into account. It requires 
us to wait until further data become available to conduct panel estimation to assess 
the long run relationship between inequality and growth. 
Finally, we should emphasise that this study has focussed upon only one mech-
anism by which inequality affects growth. As we have reviewed in Chapter 2, there 
might be many other channels through which inequality affects growth. All the 
existing theoretical studies we have reviewed predict a negative relationship be-
tween inequality and long run growth, so in theory, we expect that overall effect 
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of inequality upon grovvth is negative. However, empirical results have not been 
that convincing in supporting these theories, so in practice, we are still not quite 
sure about the overall effect. In addition, other channels that have not been pro-
posed might exist. Inequality works through all these channels, including the one 
we looked at, and affects long run growth. 
At present, the common agreement on the relationship between inequality and 
growth is that inequality harms growth in all cases. However, it appears the re-
lationship is much more complicated. This study has clearly cast doubt upon the 
common agreement and induced needs for further investigation in this research 
area. 
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